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ABSTRACT—In this Article, I explain what a seemingly obscure statute, the 
Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, can tell us about the relationship 
between statutes and constitutional law. I use William Eskridge and John 
Ferejohn’s notion of a “superstatute” as a lens through which to view this 
relationship. A “superstatute,” in Eskridge and Ferejohn’s conception, is a 
statute that has small “c” constitutional emanations, emanations that both 
affect interpretations of the large “C” Constitution and are entrenched 
against subsequent legislative change. To better understand the precise 
contours of the notion of a superstatute, I look at the Current Tax Payment 
Act of 1943, which instituted the system of federal tax withholding for 
wage income. I describe the history of federal income tax withholding 
leading up to the passage of that Act, explaining in turn how that history 
sheds light on the underlying notion of a superstatute. 
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INTRODUCTION: ENTRENCHMENT, STATUTES, AND SUPERSTATUTES 
Entrenchment. It’s the holy grail of constitutional theory. How exactly 
does a “constitution” entrench values, policies, or what have you, such that 
a democratically elected majority is—or, ought to be—precluded from 
promulgating a currently desired policy preference? In the modern 
American context, that question is of course often asked by framing the 
problem as the countermajoritarian difficulty—when can an unelected 
judiciary override an elected legislature? We might reformulate the 
problem in slightly less institutionally oriented terms and think of it—as 
Chief Justice Marshall first articulated it and many Americans remain wont 
to do—as a question of when the words of a Constitution, ratified by a 
group of Americans in 1787–1788 and amended twenty-something times 
since then (in accordance with procedures for amendment ratified at that 
same initial “moment” in 1787–1788), conflict with the words of a statute 
and must thus necessarily override that statute.1 Of course, things have 
always been more complicated, even in Chief Justice Marshall’s day, but it 
can still be said that a single, focused written document that purports to 
entrench—at a single moment—a “higher” law remains one of the United 
States’ most lasting contributions to legal and political theory.2 The magic 
of that entrenchment is of course the source of endless fascination and is 
why some of our greatest legal minds have spent their careers grappling 
with this fundamental question: when should judges use the Constitution to 
entrench a legal principle so as to make it more difficult for legislation to 
 
1 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, 
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must 
decide on the operation of each. . . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution 
is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern 
the case to which they both apply.”). 
2 See JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE INVENTION OF AMERICA 159 
(2010) (noting that the American Revolution’s “most lasting legacy . . . was the great innovation that 
treated a constitution not as a working description of a government but as a single authoritative 
document, written at a known moment of historical time, under rules that made it legally superior to all 
the other acts that the government it created would subsequently adopt”). 
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change law? Or, more descriptively, what factors entrench the 
Constitution—that is, why do judges decide to invalidate laws as 
unconstitutional? 
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s recent book A Republic of 
Statutes is a refreshing twist on this theme: they completely reframe the 
question of entrenchment. No longer is entrenchment simply an unelected 
judiciary overriding an elected legislature or executive. Instead, 
entrenchment becomes a more complex phenomenon, whereby statutes—
the product of legislatures themselves—can in turn act to bind future 
legislatures. Simplistic American constitutional theory cannot abide such 
complexity. Under the basic later-in-time rule, a statute can always be 
repealed by a subsequent legislature. The principle dates to Roman times 
and is found clearly in Blackstone: “Acts of parliament derogatory from the 
power of subsequent parliaments bind not.”3 Only “the Constitution” can 
entrench; only the Constitution itself can prevent a legislature from making 
change. Statutes cannot entrench because they cannot be made 
unrepealable. This relationship between past statutes and the present 
legislature is not inevitable, though it often seems to be so. Just ask Britain. 
Until recently, its “Constitution” included a series of statutes, and 
notwithstanding the basic premise of parliamentary sovereignty, these 
statutes were viewed as sacrosanct, if not entrenched.4 
A fundamental part of what Eskridge and Ferejohn have done is to 
reframe what a statute is and can be. And, like all brilliant ideas, this 
reframing changes the way you see a statute and does so in a way that 
simply cannot be undone. As Eskridge and Ferejohn put it on the very first 
page of their book, “Our framework . . . reveals how [statutes, executive 
orders, congressional–executive agreements, and agency rules] have 
become entrenched, indeed to the point of molding the Constitution itself.”5 
The book is nearly 600 pages long and contains nine chapters, each on a 
completely different area of law, from rights-based statutory schemes, such 
as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and Voting Rights Act, to 
aspects of market regulation, such as the Sherman Act, to structural aspects 
of the economy, such as the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Yet, the book has 
nary a mention of tax law. This is not, I suspect, because they think there 
are no entrenched tax laws, but instead because they had already written so 
much. In this Article, I want to look at one, almost invisible, part of tax law 
 
3 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90. For a debate on whether the legislature can bind 
a future legislature, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 
111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002), arguing yes, and John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of 
Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1777 
(2003), arguing no. 
4 See ERIC BARENDT, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 26–34 (1998). 
5 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 1 (2010). 
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and ask whether it has been “entrenched” in Eskridge and Ferejohn’s 
meaning. 
Let me start with Eskridge and Ferejohn’s definition of 
“entrenchment”: 
We use the term “entrenched” to refer to norms and practices that are accepted 
not just because of their Weberian authority to command but also because of 
the force of a Weberian constellation of interests, namely, a popular 
consensus that the norm or practice is a good thing to believe or do.6 
Their emphasis is on the ways in which both formal law and social norms 
“entrench.” They describe the “process of deep entrenchment” as having 
three features: (1) public deliberation; (2) several institutions involved in 
that deliberation, both cooperating and protecting their own authority; and 
(3) deliberation that occurs “over a long period of time” and “does not 
stick . . . until former opponents agree that the norm is a good one” (or at 
least acceptable).7 They then dub a statute that is entrenched through this 
sort of public deliberation a “superstatute.” 
Though Ferejohn had previously been a Professor of Social Science (at 
CalTech) and Political Science (at Stanford),8 Eskridge and Ferejohn 
probably do not mean their theory to be grounded in social science. The 
book interweaves the descriptive and the normative too easily and does not 
really provide a testable hypothesis. This is not a criticism per se: they are 
law professors after all. Moreover, their goal is to complicate the standard 
account of how both constitutional and statutory law operate at the level of 
actual legislatures and courts. Still, their formulation raises questions about 
how closely their definition matches their own conclusions. In particular, 
are all laws that satisfy Eskridge and Ferejohn’s three features entrenched, 
while those that fail to satisfy the three features not entrenched? Or, are 
these “features” just characteristics that entrenched statutes sometimes 
share? If the former, we have the beginnings of a testable hypothesis. If the 
latter, we merely have a way to begin thinking about how we might 
construct a testable hypothesis. 
Moreover, if we take Eskridge and Ferejohn’s “three features” of 
entrenchment seriously, I think we also want to know how closely their 
definition matches one’s intuitive sense of what the concept entails: 
“entrenched” as something that is “establish[ed] so firmly that change is 
difficult.”9 For, as Adrian Vermeule has noted, Eskridge and Ferejohn’s 
conception of entrenchment differs from the way in which the term is 
usually used in constitutional scholarship—something that a current 
 
6 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
7 Id. at 7. 
8  John A. Ferejohn: Biography, N.Y.U. SCH. L., https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?
section=bio&personID=19914 (last visited May 18, 2014). 
9 CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY LUXURY EDITION 477 (12th ed. 2011). 
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majoritarian institution is prohibited from changing. As Vermeule puts it, 
“The acid test of entrenchment occurs when a statute survives despite the 
opposition of a current majority or supermajority.”10 After all, if Eskridge 
and Ferejohn’s references to social norms are to be understood properly, 
their principal point is that the current majority does not want—or seek—to 
change the laws they describe as being entrenched. 
If we compare what on the surface is the way in which entrenchment is 
defined, we see Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory and Vermeule’s theory 
seemingly at two ends of a pole: For Vermeule, entrenchment is a de jure 
concept—in what circumstances is a majority that seeks change precluded 
as a matter of law from being able to do so? For Eskridge and Ferejohn, in 
contrast, entrenchment appears to be primarily a de facto concept. Once a 
statute becomes a superstatute, it has, according to Eskridge and Ferejohn, 
become part of the majority’s preference set, and for that reason, has 
become entrenched. Vermeule’s critique is trenchant though—in what 
sense is a statute entrenched if the majority does not want to change it? 
Vermeule suggests ways out of the dilemma. One way is to note that a 
statute can sometimes engender coordination benefits, benefits that might 
outweigh the cost even for those who initially opposed the statute. Such a 
statute might thus be “entrenched” notwithstanding the opposition of a 
current majority. Vermeule’s second suggestion, though, is of a very 
different ilk. Noting that “political preferences are partially endogenous,” 
Vermeule points out that “[s]ometimes the passage of the statute . . . itself 
shapes” subsequent political preferences, and he acknowledges that this 
may be what Eskridge and Ferejohn mean with their emphasis on public 
deliberation.11 
This is not only right, but also at the core of what I suspect Eskridge 
and Ferejohn mean with their title, A Republic of Statutes. The crux of 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s agenda is neither statutory nor constitutional law, 
but rather values. The core of much constitutional jurisprudence and 
scholarship—even among those who categorically reject a “Herculean” 
approach to constitutional law12—is in fact values. By bringing statutes into 
the debate about the polity’s values, Eskridge and Ferejohn are attempting 
not simply to fiddle along the edges with the concept of entrenchment, but 
instead to raise our awareness that statutes can sometimes be at the core of 
our republic—perhaps even more so than the large “C” Constitution—
because they shape values. 
Thought of in those terms, Vermeule may be right about “the acid 
test” for entrenchment but wrong when he says that “Eskridge[] and 
 
10 See Adrian Vermeule, Superstatutes, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.tnr.com/book/
review/superstatutes (reviewing ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 5) (emphasis added). 
11 Id. 
12 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239 (1986) (positing an “imaginary judge of superhuman 
intellectual power and patience,” known as “Hercules,” as the model for judging). 
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Ferejohn’s treatment of the statutory constitution is so capacious, the 
boundaries of their enterprise so ill-defined, that it threatens to swallow up 
all of ordinary politics.”13 
If the core of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s book is values, not just statutes, 
then the crucial point is the dialectical relationship between law and the 
majority’s views. Vermeule clearly recognizes this last point, but seems to 
miss Eskridge and Ferejohn’s insistence on the role of values in shaping 
that dialectical relationship. Perhaps I am reading too much into Eskridge 
and Ferejohn’s account here, but the mere framing of each chapter’s title 
not around a particular statute but around a value—“[e]quality,” 
“[d]emocra[cy],” “the [m]arket,” “the [f]amily,” “[n]ational [s]ecurity”14—
suggests that what matters to Eskridge and Ferejohn when they focus on 
entrenchment is not so much the entrenchment of the statute qua statute but 
instead the entrenchment of the values the statutes embody. 
I. WAR, TAXES, AND THE WITHHOLDING SUPERSTATUTE 
Eskridge and Ferejohn tell us their list of superstatutes is 
“nonexhaustive,”15 but Vermeule’s challenge is to articulate the category 
with sufficient precision that legal theorists can analyze whether a statute is 
a superstatute—or at least recognize one intuitively.16 My claim in this 
Article includes four components: (1) a normative value is the core 
attribute in Eskridge and Ferejohn’s conception of a superstatute; (2) to 
understand whether a statute is a superstatute, we have to understand the 
relationship between law and societal values as dialectical; and (3) societal 
institutions play an important role in shaping that dialectical relationship 
and hence whether a statute is “super”; but (4) a value embedded into a 
judicial interpretation of the large “C” Constitution is a crucial component 
of this understanding. But even this, Vermeule could rightly reply, is 
unhelpful with the onerous task of determining the contours of the 
category. 
So, let me try a few examples. Daryl Levinson gives the mortgage tax 
deduction as an example of a politically entrenched policy,17 but intuition 
tells us this is not what Eskridge and Ferejohn have in mind. I suspect the 
answer may, at least in part, be that the entrenchment of the mortgage 
interest tax deduction is premised on self-interest, not a transcendent 
societal value. We can see this in part by the fact that Eskridge and 
Ferejohn’s chapter headings are designed to evoke values that can be 
characterized as important for “We (Us?) the People.” Their references to 
 
13 Vermeule, supra note 10. 
14 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 5, at v–vi. 
15 Id. at 16. 
16 See Vermeule, supra note 10. 
17 Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 687 (2011). 
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concepts such as “The Constitution of the Market and State Legitimacy” 
and “The Safety Net Constitution” are all attempts to frame certain statutes 
around broader normative values.18 Now one could perhaps quibble about 
the mortgage tax deduction too. After all, who doesn’t remember the 
“Ownership Society” principle celebrated during the presidency of George 
W. Bush?19 Certainly we could easily tie the mortgage tax deduction to 
home ownership as a value. That, after all, remains the ostensible public 
policy rationale (independent, of course, of the self-interest of the millions 
of its beneficiaries). And, of course, the way in which it stifles mobility, 
which itself might be another core American value, is at least one piece of 
the case against it. So, values are found in the mortgage tax deduction too. 
Still, the answer has to be that the statute providing for the mortgage 
tax deduction is not a superstatute, and the answer must lie in the way in 
which the value structure—again, the core of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s 
understanding—intersects with the entrenchment process. Entrenchment 
here does not depend on an ideological shift that the statute either sparks or 
further perpetuates. Entrenchment does not depend on an underlying 
normative view permeating American society that exalts home ownership 
over mobility. Rather, it is self-interest that acts as the vehicle through 
which entrenchment occurs. If self-interest is driving the entrenchment, 
then this cannot be a superstatute. 
So let me tweak Levinson’s example a little, making the question 
tougher for Eskridge and Ferejohn. Is the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 
a superstatute? If you have never heard of the statute, don’t worry. Perhaps 
that alone should be enough to weigh heavily, if not dispositively, against it 
being thought of as a superstatute. Having said that, there is a case to be 
made that for the vast majority of Americans, the Current Tax Payment Act 
of 1943 transformed their relationship with the federal government so 
dramatically that the statute is entrenched in the way Eskridge and Ferejohn 
mean. Yet, at the same time, it lacks some of the features of deep 
entrenchment they describe. 
As I said, if you have never heard of the Current Tax Payment Act of 
1943—and I am confident that Eskridge and Ferejohn, as steeped in our 
“republic of statutes” as they are, probably haven’t either—that’s okay. 
You have, I am sure, heard of what it did: create a system of mandatory 
federal tax withholding at the source of wage income.20 The Current Tax 
Payment Act of 1943 established tax withholding from wage income in 
such a way that it is now embedded deeply into the fabric of American 
society. Although tax withholding was a feature of both the short-lived 
Civil War income tax and the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax 
 
18 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 5, at v–vi. 
19 See, e.g., STEPHEN MOORE, BULLISH ON BUSH: HOW GEORGE W. BUSH’S OWNERSHIP SOCIETY 
WILL MAKE AMERICA STRONGER 3–11 (2004). 
20 See infra Part 38. 
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in 1913, it was World War II, the Current Tax Payment Act, and a 
legislative compromise that put the country on the path to a system that 
now shapes the relationship between the federal government and the vast 
majority of the American population. Indeed, if we are looking to 
“constitutional” principles, we might say the Current Tax Payment Act 
“constitutes” that relationship. But, as Vermeule reminds us, entrenched 
policies do not necessarily make constitutional law.21 As we will see, tax 
withholding is very different from the mortgage tax deduction, which 
seems almost trivially easy to reject as being either entrenched or in the 
category of “constitutional” law. By looking at tax withholding instead, I 
think we will begin to see a kernel of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s insight in a 
slightly new—and, I hope, clearer—light. 
Imagine a politician—let us call her Novera Groquest—whose sole 
goal is to reduce federal government revenues, actual government 
revenues, not the amount the law was written to take in. Where might our 
putative tax cutter look? She might think about state tax collection and note 
that the tax with perhaps one of the lowest collection rates is the “use 
tax”—the sales tax equivalent for purchases made out of state via phone, 
catalog, and the Internet, purchases for which tax is not collected at the 
source of the sale. So, for example, Amazon.com currently collects state 
sales tax in only a handful of states (though the list is growing), but 
residents of all other states with sales taxes are generally required to pay a 
use tax for online purchases from Amazon, in an amount equivalent to the 
state sales tax, directly to the state’s department of revenue when filing 
state income tax forms at the end of the year.22 Not surprisingly, 
compliance with this legally binding requirement is modest to say the least. 
Realizing this, Ms. Groquest might think to herself that rather than aim at 
the standard techniques of tax cutters—lowering rates, increasing 
exemptions and deductions, etc.—the best thing she could do is to 
eliminate tax collection at the source. And, of course, we know that one of 
the principal sources of federal revenue is the income tax.23 Ms. Groquest 
might think that the best way to reduce actual revenues would be to 
eliminate tax collection at the source of income—i.e., employer tax 
withholding. 
What does this have to do with constitutional law, entrenchment, or 
the “republic of statutes”? It suggests, I contend, that there are entrenched 
statutes, maybe superstatutes, and, if one stretches, even small “c” 
 
21 Vermeule, supra note 10. 
22 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “use tax” as a “tax imposed on the 
use of certain goods that are bought outside the taxing authority’s jurisdiction” and “designed to 
discourage the purchase of products that are not subject to the sales tax”); see generally 2 WALTER 
HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION § 16.01 (3d ed. 2013). 
23 HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 35 
tbl.2.2 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/assets/hist.pdf. 
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constitutional law to be found in the oddest places, embedded deep within 
societal institutions, often governmental institutions. In the case of income 
tax withholding, I am referring of course to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) and its relationship not only to the nation’s taxpaying wage earners 
but also to the country’s employers. In particular, in this Article, I want to 
explore the question of whether we could call the statutory provisions that 
established income tax withholding a “superstatute” or entrenched or in 
some sense constitutional. 
If we look at our current federal tax system, recent reformers have 
proposed numerous different types of changes—from a blanket reduction in 
rates combined with elimination of deductions and exemptions, to a flat 
tax, to a consumption tax, to filing on postcard-sized forms—but virtually 
no prominent reformer has proposed repealing income tax withholding.24 
The fact that almost no one wants to change this fundamental feature of the 
tax system suggests that it is entrenched in a de facto sense. But, income 
tax withholding at source is entrenched in another sense too. If one sought 
to argue that tax withholding is an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth 
Amendment or outside Congress’s Sixteenth Amendment power to “collect 
taxes on incomes,”25 because it is a “harbinger of state socialism”26 or a 
violation of basic liberty principles for requiring employees to “disclose to 
employers information [about] their prospective income,”27 that sort of 
constitutional claim would have very little chance of success, even though 
these were arguments against the constitutionality of withholding in the 
post-Sixteenth Amendment era. Perhaps we now see tax withholding at the 
source of income as embedded into the federal government’s Sixteenth 
Amendment power. It was not, however, always so—and, in the following 
sections of this Article, I will show how the history of federal income tax 
withholding in the United States led us to the point at which federal tax 
withholding became entrenched. 
In doing so, I would like to explore more broadly the question of 
whether it is possible to see a deeply entrenched policy—one that is 
entrenched not just because it has created an interest group, not just 
because it is in some trivial sense favored by a majority of Americans, and 
not just because it provides a coordination benefit, but primarily because of 
a complex array of social, institutional, and indeed cultural factors—as 
 
24 See, e.g., H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 2014 (2014), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Statutory_Text_Tax_
Reform_Act_of_2014_Discussion_Draft__022614.pdf (major tax reform proposal drastically reshaping 
federal tax law, but making no changes to withholding of taxes on wage income). But see Freedom and 
Fairness Restoration Act of 1994, H.R. 4585, 103d Cong. § 103; NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER, THE 
FAIRTAX BOOK: SAYING GOODBYE TO THE INCOME TAX AND THE IRS 19–30 (2005); Dick Armey, 
Review Merits of Flat Tax, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1994, at A16. 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
26 RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 308 (1954) (quoting Rep. Jenkins). 
27 Id. (citing Rep. Carlson). 
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small “c” constitutional when its actual large “C” constitutional emanations 
are so weak. 
A complex array of factors has shaped people’s expectations about the 
income tax and the meaning of the federal power embedded in the 
Sixteenth Amendment. Perhaps it is fair to characterize our conception of 
tax withholding’s entrenchment as being based on the force of social 
norms, but that strikes me as wrong. Tax withholding is not entrenched in 
the way that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is. It is true that a wave of anti-
tax sentiment could lead to the end of withholding, though that might be 
less plausible than ending the mortgage tax deduction.28 But, on the other 
hand, it strikes me as more plausible that a court could strike down aspects 
of the Civil Rights Act on constitutional grounds29 than it could similarly 
strike down tax withholding. Neither is impossible of course, but the 
former is more plausible in part because it is entrenched only—or at least 
primarily—through the means of social norms, whereas tax withholding’s 
entrenchment is embedded in an institutional context—here, the IRS. We 
might see this as what economist Charlotte Twight refers to (quite 
derisively) as “entrenchment of the machinery of government.”30 
II. A HISTORY OF U.S. INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING 
The United States has had income tax withholding at source, in fits 
and starts, since the Civil War, but withholding’s crucial moment of 
entrenchment took place with the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943. 
Before explaining this history and its connection to Eskridge and 
Ferejohn’s conception of a superstatute, let us begin with a brief 
explanation of a few crucial phrases. To start, the terms “tariffs” and 
“customs duties” refer to taxes imposed on imports or exports. Simple 
economics suggests, of course, that they lead to higher prices for 
purchasers of the dutied products, but that fact naturally remains—in the 
ordinary course—hidden from the consumer. Tariffs can be contrasted with 
the broad category of “internal taxes” (or, as we are now familiar, the term 
“internal revenue”), which refers to any type of tax other than those 
 
28 Cf. H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT 
OF 2014 § 1402 (2014), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Statutory_Text_Tax_Reform_
Act_of_2014_Discussion_Draft__022614.pdf (proposing reductions in maximum deduction for home 
mortgage interest). 
29 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the 
Court may soon have to confront the question of “[w]hether, or to what extent, . . . the disparate-impact 
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [are] consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee 
of equal protection”). 
30 CHARLOTTE A. TWIGHT, DEPENDENT ON D.C.: THE RISE OF FEDERAL CONTROL OVER THE LIVES 
OF ORDINARY AMERICANS 127 (2002). 
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imposed on a nation’s imports or exports.31 Excise and sales taxes are 
internal taxes, but like tariffs, are imposed on transactions.32 The term 
“direct tax” has acquired a distinctive meaning and become a term of art in 
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence.33 Although the details of that debate are 
not relevant at the moment, I will use the phrase primarily as meaning a tax 
imposed directly on a person or property. Head (or “capitation”) taxes and 
property (both real and personal) taxes are direct taxes. Of course, the 
question of whether an income tax—whether one imposed on the income 
from property (rent, dividends, interest, etc.) or labor (salary, wages, 
etc.)—is a “direct tax” (in the sense the Constitution uses the term) was 
contested in the nineteenth century.34 For now though, I will limit the 
conception of direct tax so as to exclude income taxes. The phrase “income 
tax withholding” refers to a process by which taxes are withheld from 
income at source. Unsurprisingly, governments generally find that tax 
withholding increases compliance with laws imposing tax liability on 
income.35 Income tax withholding thus makes income taxes bear a 
resemblance to other means of collecting taxes such as excise or sales taxes 
and tariffs. The phrase “current tax payment,” in contrast, refers simply to a 
system whereby taxes are paid “currently”—in other words, at the time the 
relevant transaction occurs. For income tax, the phrase would thus refer to 
tax payment at the point at which the income is earned. Though intertwined 
in our modern minds with tax withholding, the concept of current tax 
 
31 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 1593 (defining “tariff” as “duties imposed by 
a government on imported or exported goods”); id. at 890 (defining “internal revenue” as 
“[g]overnmental revenue derived from domestic taxes rather than from customs or import duties”). 
32 In modern parlance, the term “sales taxes” usually refers to taxes charged as a percentage of the 
value of the goods—ad valorem, as they say—whereas excise taxes are imposed on a unit of measure. 
So, broad state sales taxes—e.g., 5.5% of the value of the goods sold—are sales taxes, while taxes on 
cigarettes or gasoline are excise (because they are imposed on a per-pack or per-gallon basis). See id. at 
1597 (defining “sales tax” as a “tax imposed on the sale of goods and services, usu[ally] measured as a 
percentage of their price”); id. at 646 (defining “excise tax” to include a “tax imposed on the 
manufacture, sale, or use of goods”); see, e.g., I.R.C. § 4611(a), (c) (2012) (imposing excise tax on 
crude oil and petroleum products on per-barrel basis); id. § 5001(a)(1) (imposing excise tax on alcohol 
on a per-gallon basis). 
33 For a sampling of the literature on this question, see Charlotte Crane, Reclaiming the Meaning of 
“Direct Tax” 2 n.3 (Feb. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1553230. 
34 See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, vacated on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); 
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881). 
35 Indeed, in 1803, when Great Britain first introduced “stoppage-at-source,” as withholding was 
known, this was precisely the rationale. Self-reporting of income “was found to depend to[o] much on 
the imperfection of human nature. It became unequal in the execution, and thereby defeated its own 
principle.” AN EXPOSITION OF THE ACT FOR A CONTRIBUTION ON PROPERTY, PROFESSIONS, TRADES, 
AND OFFICES; IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE ACT ARE FULLY CONSIDERED, WITH 
A VIEW TO FACILITATE ITS EXECUTION, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS CHARGEABLE, AS PERSONS 
LIABLE, TO THE TAX BY WAY OF DEDUCTION, AND THE OFFICERS CHOSEN TO CARRY IT INTO EFFECT 3 
(London, I. Gold 1803). 
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payment does not inherently require withholding. One could imagine taxes 
being due upon receipt of the income, with the burden of paying the tax 
being placed on the earner, not the employer. Moreover, withholding does 
not necessarily imply taxes being paid “currently.” For example, an 
assessment on the previous year’s taxes could be made (let us say, by 
January 15th of the following year), and the tax due from that previous year 
could then be withheld from a worker’s salary at that point, either in a lump 
sum if the amount is small enough or in installments. To be sure, neither of 
these approaches is how our income tax system works, but, as we will see, 
we could have set the system up in this way.36 The fact that we intertwined 
tax withholding with the idea of “current payment” was part of what 
allowed income tax withholding to become so integrated into our income 
tax system. 
As I explain in more detail below, one of my themes here will be to 
extract from Eskridge and Ferejohn’s A Republic of Statutes the notion of 
administrative constitutionalism. Tax withholding is intimately connected 
with tax collection—it enables and facilitates tax collection. If we see tax 
collection as the linchpin of taxation itself, we can see that the 
administrative apparatus of tax collection (and perhaps even tax 
assessment) can be thought of in Eskridge and Ferejohn’s terms as part of 
America’s “working constitution.”37 Going further, let me suggest that the 
creation of an institutional structure for income tax collection—of which 
tax withholding is one important component—can arguably be seen as 
“interpreting” the Sixteenth Amendment. Inquiring whether that is enough 
to render the Current Tax Payment Act a superstatute with small “c” 
constitutional emanations—one that is entrenched in a meaningful way—
will, I hope, help us better understand what entrenchment means. 
In the following subsections, I look at the history of income tax 
withholding up to (and including) the 1943 Current Tax Payment Act. 
Obviously, income tax withholding requires an income tax, and 
understanding the way in which withholding became part of the income tax 
in 1943 requires some understanding of the income tax itself prior to that 
point. Sections A, B, and D discuss that history and explain that income tax 
withholding was by no means a completely new phenomenon in 1943. But, 
the story of income tax withholding is not complete without understanding 
the development of the administrative mechanism that enabled 
withholding. To understand that requires understanding the development of 
the administrative processes for the collection of Social Security taxes, for 
as I explain in section C, it was the fact that by 1943 withholding of Social 
Security taxes was an existing facet of the relationship between wage 
 
36 This is how withholding worked in England and Australia during the early 1940s. See George E. 
Lent, Collection of the Personal Income Tax at the Source, 50 J. POL. ECON. 719, 720–21 (1942). 
37 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 5, at 9. 
108:859 (2014) What a History of Tax Withholding Tells Us 
871 
earners and the federal taxing authorities that made withholding 
administratively possible. 
A. Civil War 
The nation’s first federal income taxes, adopted during the Civil War, 
included withholding as part of the tax collection machinery. As I explain 
in more detail, the approach to withholding in the various Civil War 
income tax laws depended on several salient facts: (1) treatment of 
withholding as a tax that was distinct from (although very similar to) the 
income tax; and (2) inequities between the withholding tax and the income 
tax, inequities that were due to the need for administrative convenience. 
Although President Madison’s Secretary of the Treasury Alexander 
Dallas had proposed a federal income tax during the War of 1812,38 it was 
not until the Civil War that the United States first enacted such a tax. It 
should not be surprising that it was war—and a bitter and expensive one at 
that—that led to a federal tax innovation.39 It was, after all, a dramatic 
increase in federal expenditures and the concomitant need for money that 
forced Congress to look for new sources of revenue. From the end of the 
War of 1812 until the Civil War, the federal government had received 
virtually all of its revenue from two sources: customs duties and public 
land sales.40 There were no federal income taxes, direct taxes, or excise 
taxes—in short, no internal taxes of any kind.41 
The war necessitated a dramatic shift in federal tax policy. Although 
the details of this shift are not necessary here, I want to focus on the 
introduction of taxes that were subject to what we would now call 
“withholding.” The first income tax was adopted during a special session of 
Congress during the summer of 1861.42 Secretary of the Treasury Salmon 
Chase proposed a series of new taxes, including $20 million “by direct 
taxes or internal duties or excises, or both.”43 Because the Constitution 
 
38 EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 
OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 430 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2d ed., rev. & enl. 
with a new chapter 2004) (1911). 
39 See generally STEVEN A. BANK ET AL., WAR AND TAXES, at xii (2008) (noting that “[w]ar has 
been the most important catalyst for long-term, structural change in the nation’s fiscal system”). The 
sentence in the text might need an emphasis on the word “federal.” Some states had income taxes prior 
to the Civil War (some of which originated with colonial-era “faculty taxes”), as had both England and 
Prussia. See SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 57–166, 223–42, 367–406. Robert Stanley minimizes the 
innovative nature of the Civil War income tax. See ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE 
SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861–1913, at 38 (1993). Whether he is 
correct or not in his characterization is not crucial to me here because my focus is on federal policy. 
40 HARRY EDWIN SMITH, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HISTORY FROM 1861 TO 
1871, at 1 (1914). 
41 Id. at 1, 24; see also Act of Dec. 23, 1817, 3 Stat. 401 (repealing internal taxes). 
42 SMITH, supra note 40, at 45–48. 
43 SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 431. 
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required that direct taxes be apportioned to the states according to their 
population,44 there was intense opposition to the direct taxes from those in 
the agricultural West and South.45 The unfairness of imposing a tax that 
would effectively place equal burdens on every single person in the country 
led to outcries when the bulk of the nation’s wealth was in the Northeast.46 
Although Chase’s proposal was vague as to exactly what form of direct tax 
to impose, the most common type of direct tax was a tax on real property, 
and the assumption was that this is what he meant.47 If so, however, that 
would only make the unfairness more pronounced: a real property tax 
would completely exempt much of the wealth in the Northeast, because it 
took the form of stocks and bonds.48 The compromise that resulted was to 
reduce the revenues derived from the direct tax and to adopt the first 
federal income tax in U.S. history.49 This 1861 Revenue Act imposed an 
income tax with a 3% rate and an $800 annual exemption.50 It covered 
income earned during calendar year 1861 and required payment of the tax 
prior to June 30, 1862.51 
Though the 1861 Revenue Act formally went into effect immediately 
upon passage, the income tax portion of it was never enforced. One 
problem was the simple practical question of how to enforce it. An income 
tax was new and would require administrative machinery for collection; it 
would require, to start with, the hiring of new federal officials to assess and 
 
44 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
45 HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE GREATEST NATION OF THE EARTH: REPUBLICAN ECONOMIC 
POLICIES DURING THE CIVIL WAR 112 (1997); see also SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 431 (“[T]he chief 
objections to the scheme consisted in the fact that it was confined to real estate, and . . . the 
constitutional method of levying the tax by apportionment would result in crass inequality, bearing with 
especial rigor upon the western states.”). Of course, because most of the southern states had seceded by 
this point, the South’s opposition was less important. Still, the special session of Congress that met 
during the summer of 1861 included some representatives and senators from southern states. See 
KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, 1789–
1983, at 95 (1982). The “sectional effects” of an income tax remained a crucial issue even in 1913 with 
the passage of the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax. See, e.g., HAROLD B. HINTON, CORDELL 
HULL: A BIOGRAPHY 140 (1942); Cordell Hull, Some Features of the New Income Tax Law, in N.Y. 
STATE BAR ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING 121, 142 (1914). 
46  Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. ECON. 416, 418 (1894). This dividing line, 
including intense opposition to the income tax in the Northeast, was also a feature of the 1894 debates 
around the income tax that was eventually struck down in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 
U.S. 429, vacated on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). See KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, INCOME TAXATION: 
METHODS AND RESULTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 258 (1910); SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 499–508, 
520–21. 
47 See Hill, supra note 46, at 418. 
48 See SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 431–32. 
49 See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, §§ 49–51, 12 Stat. 292, 309–11 [hereinafter 1861 Revenue Act]. 
50 Id. § 49, 12 Stat. at 309. $800 in 1861 was the equivalent of approximately $20,000 in 2013. See 
Morgan Friedman, THE INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.westegg.com/inflation (last visited May 
18, 2014). 
51 See 1861 Revenue Act, §§ 49, 51, 12 Stat. at 309–10. 
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collect the tax. Although the law authorized the President and Secretary of 
the Treasury to create such an administrative system,52 doing so would have 
been a significant task. In contrast, direct taxes—because of the 
constitutional requirement that they be apportioned based on state 
populations—could be collected directly (if you’ll pardon the pun) from the 
state governments themselves. That way, the states could collect the tax 
any way they so chose, using their preexisting tax collection processes.53 
The laws imposing direct taxes during the War of 1812 had similarly 
permitted states to pay their apportionment in a lump sum directly to the 
U.S. Treasury,54 and that is certainly how Secretary Chase envisioned 
collection of the direct tax. 
Given this approach to collecting the direct tax, it was the income tax 
alone that would have required a new federal administrative system. Given 
Chase’s skepticism that the new income tax would yield any significant 
revenues at all, he took no steps to enforce it.55 In any event, Congress was 
scheduled to return for its regular session in December 1861—before any 
income tax payments were due—and both Chase and Congress recognized 
full well that Congress would likely have to revisit tax issues then.56 Sure 
enough, by the end of 1861, events in the war made the summer predictions 
about needs for revenue seem woefully inadequate. 
So in 1862, Congress passed a second tax law, the 1862 Revenue 
Act.57 Again, the law included a wide variety of both tariffs and internal 
taxes and again, a crucial question involved the imposition of a direct tax. 
Once again, the divisions were drawn primarily on regional lines, and once 
again, the resulting law was a compromise between advocates of a direct 
tax on real property, one that would be apportioned on the basis of 
population, and an income tax, which would not be so apportioned. This 
time, though, the resulting compromise strongly favored advocates of the 
income tax. The direct tax “was suspended for two years,” by which time 
“[i]t had been driven from the field by its rival, the income tax.”58 
 
52 See id. §§ 9, 12, 12 Stat. at 296–97. 
53 See id. § 53, 12 Stat. at 311–12; SMITH, supra note 40, at 46. 
54 See Act of Jan. 9, 1815, § 40, 3 Stat. 164, 179; Act of Aug. 2, 1813, § 7, 3 Stat. 53, 71; SMITH, 
supra note 40, at 25. 
55 Hill, supra note 46, at 420. In late 1861, prior to any collection of the 1861 Act’s income tax, 
Chase wrote, “Considering . . . how large a proportion of incomes, after the deductions sanctioned by 
law, will fall within the exemption limit of $800 a year; and considering also what numerous questions 
will certainly perplex its assessment and collection, [the Secretary] respectfully submits to the 
consideration of Congress whether the probable revenue affords a sufficient reason for putting in 
operation, at great cost, the machinery of the act, with a view . . . to the collection of the income tax 
alone.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE 
OF THE FINANCES FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1861, at 15 (1861). 
56 Hill, supra note 46, at 420. 
57 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 [hereinafter 1862 Revenue Act]. 
58 Hill, supra note 46, at 422. 
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Due to the need for greater revenue and the fact that the direct tax was 
suspended, the 1862 Act increased the income tax. The exemption was 
reduced to $600 and a new graduated tax—albeit, one that was only 
modestly progressive—was introduced. The basic rate remained at 3%, but 
for income over $10,000 (the equivalent of approximately $222,000 today), 
the rate was 5%.59 The bill was signed into law on July 1, 1862, and among 
its provisions was a repeal of the income tax in the 1861 Revenue Act.60 
This first form of what we would today call an income tax actually 
consisted of several different taxes, and it is here that the nation’s tentative 
steps into withholding began. The 1862 Revenue Act contained several 
different titles covering what we would today view as income. The first 
was entitled “Railroad Bonds,”61 and despite its name, it covered both the 
interest from railroad company bonds and the dividends from railroad 
company stock. The tax was imposed directly on the company itself,62 not 
on the recipient of interest or dividends, and it consisted of a 3% tax on the 
interest and dividends paid by the company. The law then “authorized and 
required” the company to “deduct and withhold from all payments 
made . . . the said duty or sum of three per centum.”63 In other words, 
though the tax was strictly speaking imposed on the railroad company, the 
company was required to pass the tax through to its bond- and 
stockholders. The next title of the Act was called “Banks, Trust 
Companies, Savings Institutions, and Insurance Companies,” and it 
imposed a similar 3% tax, though just on the dividends paid by such 
companies, again with a requirement that the companies deduct the amount 
from dividend payments.64 These taxes were widely viewed as taxes on the 
individual, not the company.65 
The next title in the 1862 Act was called “Salaries and Pay of Officers 
and Persons in the Service of the United States, and Passports.”66 This 
portion of the law imposed on “all salaries” of those working for the federal 
government, “when exceeding the rate of six hundred dollars per annum, a 
 
59 Id. For a more precise and detailed explanation, see infra text accompanying notes 61 to 72. To 
give a sense of the impact of the $600 exemption, it is worth noting how few people paid the income 
tax. Although figures were not kept prior to 1866, the highest percentage of the population that ever 
paid the tax was 1.3%. See STANLEY, supra note 39, at 40. 
60 1862 Revenue Act, § 89, 12 Stat. at 473. 
61 Id. § 81, 12 Stat. at 469. 
62 Or, strictly speaking, on “any person or persons owning or possessing, or having the care or 
management of any railroad company or railroad corporation.” Id. 
63 Id. § 81, 12 Stat. at 469–70 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. § 82, 12 Stat. at 470. 
65 See Hill, supra note 46, at 427. 
66 § 87, 12 Stat. at 472. Passports? Yes, the same title imposed a $3 fee for every passport issued. 
Id. Clearly, the legislative classification process has always been an inexact science. 
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duty of three per centum on the excess above the said six hundred 
dollars”—in essence, a 3% marginal tax rate on amounts over $600.67 
The next title was called “Advertisements,” and it imposed on 
publishing companies a 3% tax “on the gross receipts for all 
advertisements.”68 This of course is an ad valorem sales tax, not an income 
tax, and the 1862 Revenue Act also contained other ad valorem sales taxes, 
including on manufactured goods, in earlier titles. Though these are not 
income taxes, bear with me for a moment. The importance of these ad 
valorem sales taxes will become relevant in a moment. 
Finally there was the title named “Income Duty.” It imposed a tax 
“upon the annual gains, profits, or income of every person residing in the 
United States, whether derived from any kind of property, rents, interest, 
dividends, salaries, or from any profession, trade, employment, or 
vocation . . . or from any other source whatever, except as hereinafter 
mentioned.”69 The rate was 3% on amounts over $600 if the person’s 
income was between $600 and $10,000 and 5% on amounts over $600 if 
income was above $10,000.70 The law then provided that this “income 
duty” would not be levied on interest and dividends from railroad 
companies, dividends from banks, trust companies, etc., and salaries from 
the U.S. government. But, it did something more. It also excluded all 
“gains, profits, or income . . . derived from advertisements, or any articles 
manufactured, upon which specific, stamp or ad valorem duties shall have 
been directly assessed or paid.”71 
With this detail, we can see a few things about the nation’s first 
assessed income tax. First, it included withholding. Second, withholding 
was limited to dividends from a select set of companies, bond interest from 
one type of company, and federal government salaries. Third, the 
legislation drafters created a withholding system by treating what we would 
today call “income” as not being income. Indeed, income on which 
withholding was not imposed was treated the same as gross receipts from 
 
67 Id. § 86, 12 Stat. at 472. 
68 Id. § 88, 12 Stat. at 472. 
69 Id. § 90, 12 Stat. at 473. 
70 Id. Yes, you read that right. Congress clearly hadn’t thought through the concept of the marginal 
tax rate. Someone with $9999 in income would pay $281.97 and someone with $10,000 in income 
would pay $470, amounting to a whopping 18,803% marginal rate for the ten thousandth dollar of 
income. 
71 Id. § 91, 12 Stat. at 474. Notice that this badly worded provision might have been read to exclude 
from income virtually all business profits, most of which were derived from some type of “article[] 
manufactured.” One early twentieth-century scholar contended that no one took advantage of this, see 
SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 438, but no one really could have, because the words “or any articles 
manufactured” were repealed a year later, see Act of Mar. 3, 1863, § 1, 12 Stat. 713, 718 (amending the 
1862 Revenue Act), before any income tax payments were due. See 1862 Revenue Act, § 92, 12 Stat. at 
474 (stating that the first “duties on incomes herein imposed” were not due until June 30, 1863). 
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publishers’ advertising revenue. Both were excluded from the actual 
“income duty” in exactly the same way.72 
This approach obviously made drafting the withholding provisions 
easier, but it also led to what we can easily identify as inequities. First, the 
interest and dividend withholding lacked a $600 exemption. Many 
“widows and orphans,” whose sole income came from bond interest, had 
3% deducted from all their income.73 The flip side, of course, is that Mr. 
Moneybags, the financier whose income from railroad or financial 
institutions’ stock dividends or railroad bond interest exceeded $10,000, 
would, according to the statute, still pay only the 3% rate.74 The reason for 
these inequities, though, is probably obvious: administrative convenience. 
To pay the tax, the companies subject to it simply calculated a lump-sum 
3% of their total interest or dividend payment. They thus had no need to 
keep track of the tax payments of individual stock- and bondholders, 
because as I noted above, the tax was strictly speaking on the company 
paying the interest or dividend, not on the holders of the securities.75 
Withholding from the salaries of U.S. government officials had a 
similar inequity vis-à-vis the “income duty,” but it was of much less 
practical effect. Although salary withholding did require federal paymasters 
 
72 These statutory classifications also mattered to the internal workings of the new administrative 
structure. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s first report, covering the year ending June 30, 1863 
(published at the end of 1863), accounted for the “revenue received from tax on salaries” (i.e., tax 
revenue from government salaries) in a completely separate table from all other revenues. See REPORT 
OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SYSTEM FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1863, at 231 tbl.C (1864). Likewise, receipts from 
“[d]ividends, interest, and premiums from banks, railroads, insurance companies &c., sections 81, 82, 
84” were kept distinct from the tax receipts from “Income, section 90.” See id. at 208–27. Indeed, the 
Commissioner distinguished receipts from each of the different types of companies subject to the taxes 
on dividend and interest. See id. at 204; cf. id. at 183–84 (providing a breakdown of revenue derived 
from “incomes” as a distinct category). The 1864 Report is similar—indeed, the 1864 Report created a 
new table especially for “[c]ollections from banks, insurance, railroad, canal and turnpike companies.” 
See REPORT ON THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE SYSTEM FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1864, at 260–71 tbl.B (1865); see also id. at 248–49 
(“Incomes”); id. at 273–74 tbl.C (“Salaries”). 
73 See Hill, supra note 46, at 428. 
74 This particular inequity was caught by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue who issued 
regulations requiring assessors to impose an additional 2% tax on anyone with an income of over 
$10,000 who deducted from their tax return the dividend or interest income for which the company had 
already paid taxes. See SMITH, supra note 40, at 55. We can see that right from the beginning of the 
income tax, tax administrators sought to address inequities, including those caused by differential 
withholding rules that were specifically written into the statute. 
75 See id.; Hill, supra note 46, at 427. One recent commentator has suggested that this disparity 
could have been either an oversight or the result of legislative compromise, see Scott A. Taylor, 
Corporate Integration in the Federal Income Tax: Lessons from the Past and a Proposal for the Future, 
10 VA. TAX REV. 237, 264 (1990), but another has countered that “more likely it was a result of the 
administrative difficulties of imposing a graduated tax at the business level,” STEVEN A. BANK, FROM 
SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 21 
(2010). 
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to keep track of individual payments and to exempt the first $600 of annual 
income, it did not require a 5% rate for those making more than $10,000. 
Since few federal officials made that sum of money, though, this hardly 
mattered.76 
A further inequity arose from an amendment to the law that went into 
effect before any “income duty” payments were due. The amendment 
provided that a person subject to the “income duty” could deduct “the 
amount actually paid . . . for the rent of the dwelling-house or estate on 
which he resides.”77 The salaries of soldiers and other federal employees, 
however, had no deduction for rent.78 
Another inequity between the official “income duty” and these other 
taxes that we would today also see as taxes on “income” was the initial 
dates of coverage. The law went into effect on July 1, 1862, and the 
withholding provisions kicked in immediately after passage of the law. The 
“Railroad Bonds” and “Banks, Trust Companies, Savings Institutions, and 
Insurance Companies” provisions required the payment of the tax on any 
interest or dividends paid after July 1, 1862;79 and the withholding from 
U.S. government officials salaries began on August 1, 1862.80 In contrast, 
the “income duty,” which was not due until June 30, 1863,81 applied to 
income for the entire calendar year starting from January 1, 1862.82 
One final inequity that was not explicitly written into the law but was 
of great importance was the significant differences in tax evasion potential. 
Employees of the U.S. government simply could not avoid the tax—it was 
taken out before they even received their pay—whereas all other 
employees could.83 Similarly, railroad company bondholders could not 
avoid the tax on their interest, whereas all other creditors could. And, 
finally, the shareholders of stock of railroad companies, banks, trusts, etc. 
were likewise effectively subject to the tax before receiving their payments 
and were thus unable to avoid it. 
In short, income tax withholding began with Congress defining the 
sums subject to withholding as not being “income”—and doing so in ways 
 
76 See SMITH, supra note 40, at 54; Hill, supra note 46, at 427. 
77 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, § 11, 12 Stat. 713, 723 (amending the 1862 Revenue Act); see also SMITH, 
supra note 40, at 56 (discussing the amendment). 
78 See Joseph L. Bopeley, Pay-as-You-Go, Civil War Style, 21 TAXES 376, 376–77 (1943). 
79 1862 Revenue Act, § 81, 12 Stat. at 469; id. § 82, 12 Stat. at 470. 
80 Id. § 86, 12 Stat. at 472. 
81 Id. § 92, 12 Stat. at 474. 
82 Id. § 91, 12 Stat. at 474 (“[T]he duty . . . shall be assessed and collected upon the income for the 
year ending the thirty-first day of December next preceding the time for levying and collecting said 
duty, that is to say, on the first day of May, eighteen hundred and sixty-three . . . .”). 
83 Although it is probably impossible to determine with any precision how much evasion of the 
Civil War-era income tax took place, one early twentieth-century scholar has estimated “that not more 
than one-tenth of the actual taxable income of the country was reached.” KENNAN, supra note 46, at 
256. 
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that created some obvious inequities—in large part to facilitate the 
administrative process of tax collection. 
The next major revenue statute of the war, the 1864 Revenue Act, 
continued the same basic approach, although it did increase rates. The $600 
exemption remained, but the lowest rate was raised from 3% to 5%; a 
second rate—7.5%—for amounts between $5000 and $10,000 was created; 
and the top rate, for incomes over $10,000, was increased to 10%.84 The 
approach to withholding, however, remained the same. Five percent was to 
be withheld from dividends and bond interest from certain types of 
companies, and again the tax was imposed on the company, not the stock- 
and bondholders.85 One key distinction with the 1862 Revenue Act, 
however, was that companies were no longer required to deduct the tax 
from the payments to the individual owners of the securities.86 The 
approach to U.S. government salaries was the same as the 1862 Act: for 
amounts above $600, a 5% tax was withheld.87 These amounts were then all 
excluded from the income subject to tax in exactly the same way as in the 
1862 Revenue Act.88 All the basic inequities that I described with the 1862 
Act remained,89 though of course things would have improved dramatically 
for bondholders of company debt if the company paid the bond interest tax 
without deducting it from the interest payment.90 The 1864 Revenue Act, 
did, however, rearrange the statutory structure so that all these provisions 
were in a single title with the heading “Income.”91 
 
84 Act of June 30, 1864, § 116, 13 Stat. 223, 281 [hereinafter 1864 Revenue Act]. The language of 
the Act did solve the problem of the outrageous marginal rate for the ten thousandth dollar in the 1862 
Revenue Act, see supra note 70, by making all the rates marginal rates. 
85 1864 Revenue Act, § 120, 13 Stat. at 283–84. The range of companies subject to the payment of 
the tax on bond interest was expanded to include “canal, turnpike, canal navigation, [and] slackwater 
compan[ies],” id. § 122, 13 Stat. at 284, but the approach was identical. 
86 Recall that the 1862 Revenue Act “authorized and required” the withholding. See supra text 
accompanying note 63. In contrast, the 1864 Revenue Act provided that the companies were simply 
“authorized to deduct and withhold from all payments . . . the said duty of five per centum.” § 120, 
13 Stat. at 284. Apparently, according to one nineteenth-century commentator, the tax on at least bond 
interest effectively amounted to a tax on the corporation, because “as a matter of fact [the corporations] 
generally assumed the tax themselves without withholding it from the bondholder.” Edwin R.A. 
Seligman, The Income Tax, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 610, 629 (1894). 
87 1864 Revenue Act, § 123, 13 Stat. at 285. 
88 See id. § 117, 13 Stat. at 281. 
89 See supra text accompanying notes 73–83. 
90 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued 
regulations providing that “[t]axes paid by corporations cannot be allowed as deductions from the 
income of a stockholder.” GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX 
SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES; INCLUDING THE FORMS AND REGULATIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, THE DECISIONS AND RULINGS OF THE COMMISSIONER, 
TOGETHER WITH EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE OFFICE 153 (Boston, Little, Brown & 
Co. 4th ed. 1864), cited in BANK, supra note 75, at 20. 
91 See 1864 Revenue Act, 13 Stat. at 281. Once again, as with the 1861 Revenue Act, the income 
tax provisions of the law never went into effect because Congress repealed the law on March 3, 1865, 
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While the 1864 Revenue Act was winding its way through Congress, 
Secretary of the Treasury Chase lobbied for an additional income tax to 
meet increased revenue needs.92 So Congress passed a joint resolution 
imposing a special one-time income tax on all 1863 income (again, with a 
$600 exemption), to be collected by October 1, 1864. This resolution 
explicitly stated that government salaries and interest income and dividends 
subject to withholding would be subject to the special tax.93 This created 
somewhat of a conundrum, particularly for assessing and collecting the 
special tax from soldiers in the field. The district assessor from the soldier’s 
locality generally had little contact with those in the military because the 
assessor understood that the soldier’s salary was subject to withholding. By 
the time the war had ended, the vast majority of the one-time special-tax 
assessments against those in the army and navy had not been paid. 
Eventually, though, Congress cancelled the special-tax liabilities for all 
officers and soldiers who had been honorably discharged.94 
When the war ended in April 1865, there were calls to reduce internal 
taxes. Although there was an enormous public debt still to be repaid, tax 
receipts in 1865–1866 came in much higher than expected. So Congress 
passed a tax-reduction bill.95 Despite reducing internal taxes in general, this 
first postwar tax law made only minor changes to the income tax. But it did 
make one important change to the salary withholding process: it provided 
that federal paymasters were to withhold taxes for salaries over $5000 at 
the same marginal rate—10%—as the rate imposed on other income.96 
In essence, this provision required the rates in the salary withholding 
provision to match those in the “income duty.” This was obviously a way 
to end the inequity between “salaries” and other income that I described 
earlier.97 Given the wartime inflation and the introduction of the 
 
prior to the due date for tax payments. The 1865 Revenue Act changed the rates so that the 10% 
marginal rate kicked in at $5000, rather than $10,000, but because the withholding provisions only 
imposed a 5% rate in any case, the 1865 Revenue Act left the 1864 withholding provisions intact. See 
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 469, 479 (amending the 1864 Revenue Act). 
92 See SMITH, supra note 40, at 64. 
93 See H.R.J. Res. 77, 38th Cong. (1864). 
94 See Bopeley, supra note 78, at 377. 
95 See Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. 98 (including in its title “[a]n Act to reduce Internal 
Taxation”). 
96 See id. § 9, 14 Stat. at 139. When initially passed, every income tax was assumed by most 
congressmen to be a temporary measure that would end when the revenue needs associated with the war 
were over. After all, as I noted at the beginning of this section, most of Congress—indeed, most of the 
country—saw internal taxes as unnecessary for the ordinary peacetime operations of the federal 
government. Sunset provisions were often written directly into the law. So, for example, the 1867 
amendments to the 1864 Revenue Act specifically provided that the law’s income tax would expire in 
1870 (covering income through the end of 1869). See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 480 
[hereinafter 1867 Revenue Act]. The law failed, however, to set an end date for the withholding taxes 
on salaries, dividends, and bond interest. 
97 See supra text accompanying note 76. 
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“greenbacks” in 1863, the number of federal government employees 
benefitting from the rate disparity on salaries over $5000 had increased. 
This provision, however, effectively lasted less than a year, as the 
following Congress eliminated the graduated rate structure altogether, 
raising the exemption to $1000 and setting a single tax rate of 5% for all 
income above the $1000 exemption;98 this rate structure was applied 
equally to all governmental salaries.99 In 1870, Congress vigorously 
debated whether to continue the income tax, and once again, compromise 
was the order of the day. The income tax—and withholding—was given a 
two-year reprieve, although the exemption was raised to $2000 and the rate 
reduced to 2.5%.100 In 1872, the income tax then expired on its own terms 
without much congressional support for its continuance.101 Those taxes 
subject to withholding (the government salary tax and the tax on dividends 
and bond interest) also expired.102 
 
98 See 1867 Revenue Act, § 13, 14 Stat. at 477–78. 
99 See id. § 13, 14 Stat. at 480. The 1864 Revenue Act’s income tax provisions were similarly set to 
sunset in 1870. See 1864 Revenue Act, § 119, 13 Stat. 223, 283. Again, however, there was no sunset 
clause for the federal employees’ salary tax. See 1867 Revenue Act, § 13, 14 Stat. at 480; see also 1864 
Revenue Act, § 123, 13 Stat. at 285. 
100 See Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 225, §§ 6, 8, 11, 16 Stat. 256, 257–59 [hereinafter 1870 Revenue 
Act]. 
101 STANLEY, supra note 39, at 55–56. 
102 The 1870 Revenue Act imposed an interesting twist on those taxes subject to withholding. 
Recall that the 1862 Revenue Act imposed withholding taxes beginning in July 1862 but that incomes 
not subject to withholding were subject to the income tax for all of 1862. See supra text accompanying 
notes 79–82. In a fit of extraordinarily inconsistent drafting, Congress both recognized this fact and 
didn’t. In one section of the 1870 Revenue Act, Congress set a deadline of August 1, 1870, for the 
withholding of tax imposed by the 1867 amendments to the 1864 Revenue Act—that is, 5% on income 
over $1000. See 1870 Revenue Act, § 17, 16 Stat. at 261. Yet, in drafting the provisions of the law 
going forward, Congress ignored this fact altogether. The regular income tax covered the calendar years 
1870 and 1871, in effect expiring for income earned after December 31, 1871. The withholding taxes, 
however, also ended the same day. This expiration date applied at least to the interest and dividend 
withholding. See id. § 15, 16 Stat. at 260. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find in the 1870 statute 
any indication that the withholding tax for U.S. government salaries was continued after August 1, 
1870. Indeed, one provision in the law implies a difference of treatment between U.S. government 
salaries on the one hand and interest and dividend income on the other. When delineating what income 
is to be included in a person’s assessment, the statute states, “there shall be included all income . . . 
including any amount received as salary or pay for services in the civil, military, naval, or other service 
of the United States, or as senator, representative or delegate in Congress; except that portion thereof 
from which, under authority of acts of Congress previous hereto, a tax of five per centum shall have 
been withheld.” Id. § 7, 16 Stat. at 257–58. This language clearly refers only to withholding under the 
pre-1870 Revenue Act regime, implying that this is the only salary income subject to withholding. In 
contrast, two lines later in the same section of the statute, also excluded from income is “the amount 
received from any corporations whose officers, as authorized by law, withhold and pay as taxes a per 
centum of the dividends made, and of interest or coupons paid by such corporations,” language that 
includes withholding more broadly, not just limited to the pre-1870 Revenue Act regime. See id. § 7, 16 
Stat. at 258. The law seems, therefore, to assume that Congress wanted to exclude all dividend/interest 
income and all salaries subject to withholding from the amount of income subject to the income tax 
proper. Yet, two turn-of-the-century scholars both indicate that salary withholding and dividend/interest 
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Despite this, the withholding provision of the Civil War-era income 
tax provided the government with an efficient and relatively easily 
enforced mechanism of taxing “income.” 
Before I turn to the story of the twentieth-century income tax, let me 
add a quick word about the income tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 
1894. These provisions were effectively invalidated in 1895 in Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,103 and so never went into effect. Though the 
income tax provisions in the law largely mirrored the basic outlines of the 
Civil War income tax, withholding in the new law would have differed 
somewhat. The law did require withholding of federal government salaries 
in much the same manner as the Civil War income tax.104 There, however, 
the similarities ended. First, there was no withholding of the tax on bond 
income. Second, the law no longer provided a specific tax on corporate 
dividends at all. Instead, the law introduced the first tax on net corporate 
profits.105 Since dividends came from those profits, the theory was that 
those dividends had effectively already been taxed. Thus, the 1894 law did 
not provide any tax on the recipient of the dividends on precisely the 
grounds argued by those who oppose the taxation of dividends today: the 
 
withholding applied throughout 1871 (though neither applied between August 1 and December 31, 
1870). See SMITH, supra note 40, at 86; Hill, supra note 46, at 443–44. A third early twentieth-century 
scholar seems to agree, although what could simply be a misprint raises some ambiguity about the 
issue. Edwin Seligman writes, “The result of this whole situation was that the old five per cent tax on 
dividends and salaries continued until August 1, 1870, and that the new tax, at a rate of two and one-
half per cent, was levied only during the year 1871, with an interregnum from August 1 to December 
31, 1870. With the close of 1870 the tax on salaries and dividends ceased, while the rest of the income 
tax was still assessed in 1872, although only on the income of 1871.” SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 465–
66. Seligman also clearly refers to the August-through-December-1870 period as an “interregnum” and 
explicitly states that the 2.5% tax “was levied . . . during the year 1871.” Id. at 466. Yet, at the same 
time, he says, “With the close of 1870 the tax on salaries and dividends ceased.” Id. (emphasis added). 
If he meant 1871, then he would be in complete agreement with Hill and Smith. Finally, the most recent 
work specifically addressing the Civil War-era income tax, a 1954 doctoral dissertation, likewise asserts 
that the withheld salary tax was treated the same as the withheld dividends/interest tax. See 2 HAROLD 
Q. LANGENDERFER, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861–1872, at 664 (1980) (“[T]he tax on salaries, 
interest, and dividends was five per cent from January to August, 1870, and two and a half per cent 
during 1871.”). Moreover, the report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue indicates a significant 
amount of money collected from U.S. government salary withholding between July 1, 1871, and June 
30, 1872. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ON THE OPERATIONS OF 
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM FOR THE YEAR 1872, at VI (1872). 
103 157 U.S. 429, vacated on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); see generally 8 OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 
1888–1910, at 75–100 (1993) (discussing the decision in Pollock to invalidate the 1894 income tax 
provisions). 
104 See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 33, 28 Stat. 509, 557 [hereinafter 1894 Revenue Act]. The 
exemption was $4000, and the law provided for a single, marginal rate of 2% on income above the 
exemption. 
105 See id. § 28, 28 Stat. at 554. 
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argument against double taxation.106 The law did provide that corporations 
were required to report the name, address, and salary of each employee 
who was paid more than $4000.107 These salaries, however, were simply 
part of the expenses from which profits were calculated, and there was 
certainly no withholding on behalf of the employee in the manner provided 
for federal employees. 
B. Wilson Era 
In 1913, with the election of Woodrow Wilson and the ratification of 
the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress again brought an individual income 
tax back into its revenue arsenal.108 The 1913 tax law weaved withholding 
deeply into the fabric of the income tax in ways far more extensive than 
had the Civil War income tax. Reaching across the Atlantic to learn from 
English income tax administration,109 the 1913 law started with a 
presumption that all income would be subject to withholding at source. It 
did so in ways that might seem counterintuitive to twenty-first-century 
Americans, even those accustomed to our deeply entrenched system of 
withholding. Under the law, all payers (or “debtors,” the term the Treasury 
regulations used for those who withheld and paid income tax on behalf of 
another) of any kind—employers, stock and bond issuers, other debtors 
such as mortgagers, as well as renters—were required to withhold income 
taxes. The goal was of course primarily “to secure the maximum revenue 
and to prevent evasion by the dishonest taxpayer.”110 As we will see, 
however, the system failed to prevent evasion, and the United States’ 
experiment with a fully integrated withholding system ended a mere four 
years later. 
The reintroduction of an income tax in 1913 was found in Section II of 
the Underwood–Simmons Tariff Act and served as part of the offset for a 
 
106 See, e.g., CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? A REPORT 
OF A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE FUND FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH AND THE BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (1979). 
107 See 1894 Revenue Act, § 35, 28 Stat. at 559. The basic idea, though, was that the tax on 
corporate income was simply the Civil War dividends tax in a new guise. After all, in the mid-
nineteenth century, corporations generally distributed most of their earnings as dividends. BANK, supra 
note 75, at 21. So the extension from a dividends tax to a corporate income tax was natural because a 
corporate income tax was largely viewed as simply a tax on both dividends and undistributed profits. Id. 
at 49. So, the concept of “withholding” of the stockholder’s income tax at source had taken a small step 
toward the creation of a new and distinct concept: the corporate income tax. Although there was a clear 
sense that taxing the income of an individual owner of shares at the corporate level was primarily 
grounded on the increased likelihood of collecting the tax, the idea that a corporate income tax was 
simply a “withholding” of the shareholders’ income eventually gave way. See generally id. at 40–55. 
108 In 1909, Congress passed an “excise tax” on corporate income. This was an attempt to skirt the 
Supreme Court’s invalidation of the income tax in Pollock rather than to attack it head on, and the Court 
upheld it in 1911. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
109 See H.R. REP. NO. 63-5, at 38 (1913); see infra text accompanying note 132. 
110 See SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 336 (1967). 
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broad reduction in tariffs.111 The basic thrust of the law was to create a 1% 
tax on all income above $3000112 with an increasing “surtax” for incomes 
above $20,000.113 The rate was obviously low by today’s standards. Indeed, 
even with the “surtax,” rates were low in comparison to other countries.114 
Since $3000 in 1913 was, with inflation, the equivalent of more than 
$70,000 today, the exemption meant that only 2% of the population even 
paid the income tax at all.115 
The fact that the law affected but a sliver of the population was by 
design. But, the design was not simply aimed at “soaking the rich.”116 
Rather, drafters of the law knew that they were creating something new and 
consciously chose to start (relatively) small. As one scholar put it at the 
time, “[I]t is important to view the new income tax, not as an ideal or 
perfected system, but as the first step in the introduction of a vast and more 
or less complex system.”117 They recognized that the law would be 
 
111 Id. at 324–25. 
112 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, §§ II.A, II.C, 38 Stat. 114, 166, 168 [hereinafter 1913 Revenue 
Act]. Heads of households were entitled to a $4000 exemption, but this did not affect the withholding 
provisions. Id. § II.C, 38 Stat. at 168. 
113 See RATNER, supra note 110, at 334. The 1% “normal tax” rate covered income up to $20,000. 
Id. The so-called “surtax” provided for an additional marginal tax of the following: 
 






6% $500,000 and above
 
ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 96 (1940). 
114 See Roy G. Blakey, The New Income Tax, 4 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 34 (1914) (noting that these 
rates were lower than “most countries, as, for example, in England, Prussia, Austria, and Italy”). 
115 JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 78 (1985) 
(“[L]ess than 2 percent of the labor force filed returns in the years 1913–1915.”); see Sheldon D. 
Pollack, Origins of the Modern Income Tax, 1894–1913, 66 TAX LAW. 295, 326 (2013). 
116 The law may well have been a compromise on this point. Compare, e.g., HINTON, supra note 
45, at 143 (Hull’s “income tax . . . was not intended to redistribute the nation’s wealth”), with Blakey, 
supra note 114, at 37 (“Without doubt, the desire to level incomes, and the willingness of politicians to 
cater to the prejudices of the masses have had some part in the demand for the income tax.”). 
117 Blakey, supra note 114, at 38; see also 50 CONG. REC. 508 (1913) (“[L]ike any new tax law, it 
will be necessary for the people to become acquainted with the proposed law . . . .”); HINTON, supra 
note 45, at 141 (“[T]he [income] tax would apply to relatively few persons at first, enabling both the 
public and the tax collectors to become accustomed to its workings gradually.”); Hull, supra note 45, at 
131 (“[I]t was not deemed wise in the beginning to enact [an income tax] law of almost universal 
application, because, like all new laws, it must first be understood by the people and become adjusted to 
the intricate business conditions of the country before its administration could be expected to prove 
entirely convenient and satisfactory.”). 
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administratively burdensome and that withholding was a key part of what 
made it so. 
Initially drafted by Cordell Hull, then a Democratic member of the 
House Committee on Ways and Means,118 the income tax sections included 
withholding provisions covering three categories of income: (1) corporate 
bond income; (2) foreign bond income and foreign corporate dividends; 
and (3) a catch-all category covering any “interest, rent, salaries, wages, 
premiums, annuities, compensation, remuneration, emoluments, or other 
fixed or determinable annual gains, profits, and income,”119 with the 
exception of corporate dividends (which were not taxed because corporate 
income was already taxed). Withholding on the first two categories was 
required irrespective of amount (much like the Civil War bond interest and 
dividends tax) whereas withholding was required on the third category only 
if the amount received by a person exceeded $3000 in a taxable year, the 
amount of the exemption (similar in approach to the salary withholding for 
government employees during the Civil War).120 It is worth noting that in 
contrast to the Civil War-era “income duty,” there was no attempt to 
designate the taxes subject to withholding as somehow legally distinct from 
the income tax (i.e., a “salary tax” or a “dividend tax”), and thus no attempt 
to define “income” so as to exclude earnings that were otherwise subject to 
the withholding tax. Earnings subject to withholding were now very much 
“income.” 
Although there was a mild progressivity in income tax rates,121 the 
basic rate—the so-called “normal tax”—was 1%, and this was the 
withholding rate irrespective of the recipient’s income.122 Moreover, this 
was an actual effective rate, not a marginal rate, even for the third category, 
which required withholding only if the sum paid by the withholding agent 
exceeded $3000. So, for bond interest, since there was no $3000 
exemption, the 1% withholding rate amounted to both a 1% effective and a 
1% marginal rate. Someone with $1500 of annual bond interest from a 
corporation would have had 1% (in this case, $15) withheld from the 
payments, and someone with $4000 in bond interest would likewise have 
had 1% (in this case, $40) withheld from the payments. On the other hand, 
an employee with an annual salary of $3000 or less would have had 
nothing withheld, while an employee with, say, an annual income of $4000 
would have $40 withheld. As a practical matter, one scholar described the 
 
118 RATNER, supra note 110, at 325. 
119 1913 Revenue Act, § II.E, 38 Stat. 114, 170. 
120 Id. § II.E, 38 Stat. at 170–71. Owners of securities subject to withholding under the first two 
categories could get the exemption by filing a certificate with the withholding agent. See id. Recipients 
could deduct the “tax withheld from the total tax due on their net incomes.” See THE AMERICAN WAY 
IN TAXATION: INTERNAL REVENUE, 1862–1963, at 118 (Lillian Doris ed., 1963). 
121 See supra note 113. 
122 § II.A, 38 Stat. at 166. 
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system as follows: if an employee got paid, for example, $300 per month 
for a total of $3600 per year, he would have nothing withheld for the first 
ten months of the year. Then, in the eleventh month, the annual pay he 
received from his employer (i.e., this particular withholding agent) would 
hit $3300, thus exceeding the $3000 exemption. At that point, the employer 
would be required to withhold $33 (i.e., 1% on the total $3300, not just 1% 
on the $300 earned that month). Then in the twelfth month, the employer 
would withhold $3 (i.e., 1% of the $300 earned that month) for a total tax 
withheld of $36.123 
Now, the $3000 exemption was significant, and as I said, in the first 
few years, the number of individuals directly affected was small.124 
Moreover, the withholding arithmetic was easy. Only the “normal tax” of 
1% had to be withheld even if the amount of income exceeded $20,000, the 
point at which the graduated “surtax” kicked in.125 But, for those who had 
to withhold, the hassles were enormous. Looking at the third category of 
income subject to withholding that I described above, notice that it includes 
not only “salaries” and “wages,” but also, for example, “rents” and 
“interest” on loans. 
Moreover, in contrast to the Civil War withholding provisions for 
corporations paying bond interest and dividends—which simply required a 
lump-sum payment—the 1913 law required the withholding agent to keep 
track of the individuals for whom the tax was being withheld. So, for 
example, bond owners were required to file a certificate with the issuer of 
the bond listing the owner’s name and address; the bond issuer would then 
have to provide these certificates to the tax authorities. If the bond owner 
failed to do this, the bond issuer would be required to file a separate 
certificate attesting to that fact.126 The certificate would include not only the 
bond owner’s name and address, but also an indication of whether the bond 
owner was claiming the tax exemption and/or any of the law’s 
deductions.127 Notice, then, that the bond issuer needed to keep track of the 
certificate to determine whether the tax was to be withheld from the bond 
payment. Notice also that the claim of exemption was something that the 
bond owner could change each time payment was due and so these 
certificates would have to be filed each time there was a bond payment. 
Bond payments were usually semiannual, but remember that this was an 
era when bond interest was paid not electronically as today but upon 
 
123 See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INCOME TAXATION UNDER 
FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS § 361, at 557–58 (2d ed. 1915). 
124 See supra text accompanying note 115. 
125 The theory was that no single one of the taxpayer’s “debtors” could know the taxpayer’s total 
income. See Blakey, supra note 114, at 32. 
126 See BLACK, supra note 123, §§ 79–83, at 49–51. 
127 Strictly speaking, it was even worse, for there were separate “forms” that needed to be filed 
depending on whether an exemption or deductions or neither were being claimed. See BLACK, supra 
note 123, § 370, at 566–67; id. app. at 713–15. 
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presentation of a coupon, which entitled the bearer to payment irrespective 
of who the coupon bearer was. So this meant more paper shuffling for the 
bond issuer. It also led to delays in the payment of interest.128 Moreover, the 
bond owner could present his coupon at any time after the payment date, so 
the administrative hassle was a constant feature of life as a bond issuer, not 
just a semiannual event. Moreover, if an agent of the bond owner presented 
the coupon, the bond issuer would have to “be satisfied as to the identity 
and responsibility of the agent, calling upon him for evidence of his 
authority, if necessary, and when so satisfied, . . . writ[ing] or stamp[ing] a 
statement to that effect on the face of the certificate.”129 One goal of these 
detailed certificates was to ensure that the taxpayer who was entitled to the 
exemption in fact got it. At the same time, though, these certificates 
obviously helped the tax authorities audit if necessary, since they 
eventually got the certificates.130 
I give such detail not to bore the reader with the minutiae of a century-
old law that was repealed in 1917, but rather to give a taste of the way in 
which the law introduced administrative burdens—primarily, though not 
exclusively, on corporations—burdens that were dramatically greater than 
those imposed during the 1860s and the likes of which no one in the United 
States had ever seen before. This is of course just one example of the onus 
placed on withholding agents. There were separate regulations for dealers 
in foreign stocks and bonds, renters or mortgagors of real property, and 
others.131 Key is that these detailed regulations were, on the one hand, no 
doubt necessary to implement a full-fledged withholding system and yet, 
on the other hand, completely new and foreign to the relationship between 
the government and “debtors” in the American context. I say “foreign” in 
large part because the principle of withholding in its broad form (i.e., 
covering virtually every “payer” of any kind) was borrowed from the 
English, who had had such a system since 1799.132 So, not only did the 
principle have the backing of the top tax policy theorists of the day,133 but it 
had been tried and had worked. The approach had worked, however, in part 
because it had been around for so long. The federal income tax of 1913 
attempted to install the system without fully laying the groundwork 
 
128 See Mortimer L. Schiff, Some Aspects of the Income Tax, 58 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 15, 25 (1915). 
129 BLACK, supra note 123, § 356, at 551; id. § 116, at 73–74. 
130 Incredibly enough, the law even made the withholding agent “personally liable” for the tax 
owed by the person to whom he was indebted. See 1913 Revenue Act, § II.E, 38 Stat. at 170; Blakey, 
supra note 114, at 32. Because of this, the corporation would have to make a copy for its files—and this 
is an era of mimeographs and spirit machines, long before photocopying. See Schiff, supra note 128, 
at 22. Nor was there any reimbursement for the administrative costs incurred by businesses, costs that 
one contemporary estimated at between 10% and 20% of the taxes collected. See id. at 24. 
131 See BLACK, supra note 123, §§ 363–364, at 560–63; id. § 361, at 556–60. 
132 SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 78. 
133 See, e.g., id. at 661–62. 
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necessary to ensure that such a complicated system, one demanding the 
compliance of large numbers of entities that had to expend significant 
resources, could work.134 
The fact that the law attempted to bring withholding into this brand 
new income tax system so abruptly had its costs. Initial estimates were that 
the withholding provisions would yield two-thirds of income tax revenue,135 
but in 1916, less than 5% came from withholding.136 
So, by the time Congress next seriously addressed tax issues in 1916, 
there was a groundswell of opposition to withholding.137 Indeed, even 
Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo advocated “do[ing] away with 
the withholding of the income tax at the source, and in place thereof . . . 
requir[ing] information at the source.” McAdoo concluded “that it will 
mean the collection of a larger amount of revenue and eliminate a great 
deal of criticism which has been directed against the law.”138 Although 
Congress left withholding in place in the 1916 Revenue Act,139 it 
completely revamped the system the following year. Eliminating 
withholding for virtually all income,140 the War Revenue Act of 1917 
instituted a system of “information at source” in its stead.141 In effect, those 
“debtors” that had been required to withhold under the 1913 Revenue Act 
now merely had to report to the tax authorities the names of the recipients 
or employees along with the amounts paid to them. This change was made 
along with an increase in rates. More important for my purposes, the 
 
134 Cf. Schiff, supra note 128, at 20 (articulating some distinctions between England and the United 
States). It is worth noting that the successful Wisconsin income tax of 1911, which served as the model 
for the Revenue Act of 1913, had a system requiring payers to provide information to the tax authorities 
but did not require withholding. See Ajay K. Mehrotra, Forging Fiscal Reform: Constitutional Change, 
Public Policy, and the Creation of Administrative Capacity in Wisconsin, 1880–1920, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 
94, 106–07 (2008). 
135 See H.R. REP. No. 63-5, at 38 (1913). 
136 THE AMERICAN WAY IN TAXATION, supra note 120, at 119; see also BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra 
note 113, at 143 (estimating it as “less than one-fourth”). 
137 See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 113, at 143; Roy G. Blakey, The New Revenue Act, 6 AM. 
ECON. REV. 837, 842 (1916) (“Perhaps no feature of the income tax law has caused more unfavorable 
criticism than the stoppage-at-the-source provision, which throws much of the burden of collecting the 
government’s revenues upon banks, trust companies, corporations, and other agents.”); see also Schiff, 
supra note 128, at 20–27 (describing many problems with the withholding system). 
138 U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE 
OF FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1915, at 19 (1916); see also W. Elliot Brownlee, 
Wilson and Financing the Modern State: The Revenue Act of 1916, 129 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 173, 
197 (1985) (noting that Schiff and McAdoo “enthusiastically endorsed information at the source”). 
139 Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, sec. 8(d), 39 Stat. 756, 762. 
140 Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 1204(2), 40 Stat. 300, 332 [hereinafter 1917 War Revenue Act] 
(repealing section 8(d) of the 1916 Revenue Act). The exemptions were “for nonresident aliens and 
income from tax-free covenant bonds.” THE AMERICAN WAY IN TAXATION, supra note 120, at 119; see 
1917 War Revenue Act, § 1205(1), 40 Stat. at 332–33. 
141 1917 War Revenue Act, § 1211, 40 Stat. at 336–37. 
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individual exemption was reduced to $1000,142 and the new reporting 
requirement was triggered whenever annual payments of $800 were 
made.143 So, the number of individual recipients—in particular, 
employees—about whom information was furnished was significantly 
greater than the number for whom withholding had occurred under the 
1913 Revenue Act. Nonetheless, the burden of providing information was a 
welcome relief for everyone involved. In the end the extensive withholding 
system of the 1913 Revenue Act was perhaps just a bit too much too fast. 
The next time withholding would come to the federal income tax, that 
mistake would not be made again. 
Before I turn to the New Deal and World War II, it is worth pointing 
out what a look at the law of withholding has shown us up until now: 
nothing. Or, more precisely, by 1917, the country had had three attempts to 
experiment with withholding, but there can be no argument that 
withholding was entrenched or that the statutes embodying withholding 
were superstatutes or had any constitutional emanations of any kind. We 
can see this in numerous ways, but of course the easiest is that none of 
them lasted. Moreover, there was no claim that eliminating withholding 
raised constitutional problems. Indeed, in 1895, withholding suffered, 
along with the income tax itself, by being found unconstitutional. In both 
1872 and 1917, Congress repealed withholding. Of course, in both 1872 
and 1895, withholding itself was not at issue—withholding was simply 
necessary collateral damage from the fact that the income tax itself had 
ended. But, this is why it is the Revenue Act of 1917 that so clearly tells us 
that withholding was not entrenched in any sense of that word: an income 
tax without any withholding was not only possible, it had now become law. 
In 1913, one certainly could have thought of withholding as an integral 
component of a system of taxing income—at least with respect to certain 
types of income. After all, the federal government had never had an income 
tax without withholding. But no one viewed it that way. Though tax 
theorists of the day clearly viewed withholding as a crucial component of a 
well-functioning income tax system,144 the administrative practice 
effectively failed, whether because of actual government administrative 
failures or interest group politics. The reasons are not crucial. What is 
crucial is that starting in 1917, the federal government abandoned 
withholding—in all its forms, including those that had worked with success 
during the Civil War—as a component of its system of income tax 
administration, and no one even remotely thought this was a constitutional 
problem (whether large or small “c”). 
 
142 $2000 for head of households. Id. § 1–2, 40 Stat. at 300–01. 
143 Id. § 1211, 40 Stat. at 337. 
144 See SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 661–62. 
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C. Social Security Withholding 
The next step in understanding the ways in which withholding became 
embedded into the federal income tax takes us to the Social Security Act of 
1935. Despite the fact that the “contributions” made under the Social 
Security Act are not ordinarily viewed as part of the income tax, the 
introduction of social security was key to income tax withholding because 
it demonstrated that withholding was administratively possible—for both 
the government and employers. This laid the groundwork for the full-scale 
adoption of withholding enacted during World War II. 
President Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act on August 14, 
1935. It was an omnibus statute encompassing unemployment insurance; 
old-age, survivors, and disability insurance; and old-age and dependent 
children assistance.145 Of interest to me are the provisions covering old-age 
insurance, what we colloquially refer to today as “social security.” The old-
age insurance system was—and remains—thought of as a comprehensive, 
mandatory social insurance program into which both employees and 
employers contribute and out of which those employees who reach a 
certain age can then collect. Both workers and their employers are viewed 
as paying “contributions,” not taxes, and are viewed as having “accounts” 
from which they are paid out “benefits.” Having employees and taxpayers 
view it in these terms was important from the beginning and remains a 
cornerstone of the popular conception and popularity of the social security 
“program” today.146 
As a legal matter, however, the old-age insurance system consisted of 
two distinct features: taxes and benefits. Or, more precisely, (1) “taxes with 
respect to employment,” which consisted of an “excise” tax on employers 
and an “income” tax on employees, each of which were a percentage of the 
employees’ wages;147 and (2) a system of “federal old-age benefits,” which 
were loosely tied to those of the individual’s wages that were subject to the 
tax.148 One important reason the system was set up in this manner rather 
than as a straightforward “social insurance” program with “compulsory[] 
 
145 Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). 
146 See, e.g., Susannah Camic Tahk, Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2683, 2713–16 (2013). Roosevelt was apparently quoted years later as saying, “We put those 
payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their 
pensions . . . . With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.” 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 308–09 
(1958). 
147 See Social Security Act, §§ 801, 804, 49 Stat. at 636–37. 
148 See id. §§ 201–202, 49 Stat. at 622–23. This remains the basic structure of the system today. 
See, e.g., Allison Christians, National Report USA, in DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY CONVENTIONS 683, 685–90 (Michael Lang ed., 2006). 
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contributory . . . annuities”149 was to reduce the likelihood of the law being 
struck down by the Supreme Court.150 The structuring of the old-age 
insurance system as a tax, however, led to a bifurcation in the 
administration of the system, between the taxing provisions of the law and 
the benefits provisions. 
Title II of the Social Security Act created the benefits, and Title VIII 
imposed the taxes. The taxes, then as now, were imposed on both the 
employer and the employee, initially 1% each and slated to rise 
incrementally over time. Congress deferred the date that the old-age 
insurance system would go into effect until January 1, 1937, a full sixteen 
months after adoption of the law.151 Moreover, though the taxes (i.e., the 
“contributions”) were set to begin in 1937, the monthly benefits were 
deferred even longer, until January 1, 1942.152 Key to me here is that then—
as now—the statute required that the tax on employees “be collected by the 
employer of the taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the tax from the 
wages as and when paid.”153 In essence, the law required the employer not 
only to pay its own portion of the tax, but also to withhold and pay the 
employee’s portion as well. 
The bifurcation also applied to the administrative agencies tasked with 
establishing and managing the system. The Act created a new independent 
agency, the Social Security Board, which was in charge of benefits 
(Title II).154 In contrast, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, still part of the 
Department of the Treasury, was given control of the taxes (Title VIII).155 
Now the administrative headaches of establishing the old-age 
insurance system were obviously tremendous, and I need not belabor the 
difficulties the Social Security Board’s Bureau of Old-Age Insurance (or 
Bureau of Old-Age Benefits, as it was originally called156) had in creating 
and maintaining a central index system, along with millions of individual 
 
149 NAT’L CONFERENCE ON SOC. WELFARE, THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC 
SECURITY OF 1935 AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ACT 49–54 (50th anniversary ed. 1985). 
150 See JERRY R. CATES, INSURING INEQUALITY: ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP IN SOCIAL 
SECURITY, 1935–54, at 31 (1983). The Court did eventually uphold the old-age provisions of the Act. 
See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
151 Social Security Act, Title VIII (Taxes with Respect to Employment), §§ 801–811, 49 Stat. at 
636–39. 
152 Id. § 202(a), 49 Stat. at 623. If an individual hit 65 or died prior to January 1, 1942, the 
government would provide the 65-year-old (or, in the case of death, his estate) a lump-sum payment, 
equal to 3.5% of his post-December 31, 1936 wages. Id. §§ 203(a), 204(a), 49 Stat. at 623–24. The 
1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act accelerated the start of payments to January 1940. Social 
Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, ch. 666, sec. 201, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360, 1362. 
153 Social Security Act, § 802(a), 49 Stat. at 636. 
154 Id. §§ 701–704, 49 Stat. at 635–36. 
155 Id. § 807(a), 49 Stat. at 637. 
156 ARTHUR J. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 86 (1966). 
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employee “accounts.”157 In the days before electronic computers, the 
accounting challenge posed by the program was massive, and it is no 
wonder the Bureau’s accounting operation was referred to as “the largest 
bookkeeping job in the world.”158 By the middle of 1940, the Bureau had 
processed more than 312 million “wage items”—in essence, line items in 
an employer report listing the employee along with the amount of money 
withheld—“plac[ing them] on punch cards and then post[ing them] 
mechanically to the individual employee’s account.”159 
Almost as incredible an administrative task had to be performed on the 
taxing side of the bifurcated old-age insurance system. For that, the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue had to create a new system of withholding, payment, 
and itemization for the approximately 3.5 million employers who were to 
begin making “contributions” on behalf of their more than 30 million 
employees.160 This system had to be created effectively out of whole cloth 
because employers were previously not required to pay any taxes on behalf 
of employees. Since 1917, they had of course been providing “information 
at source” to the tax authorities—that is, they had been required to provide 
the government with information about the earnings of all high-income 
employees.161 Employees subject to income tax were then required to file 
their own annual returns and to pay all owed taxes directly themselves.162 
Moreover, the number of employees subject to the ordinary income tax was 
in any event quite small.163 With the advent of the old-age insurance 
provisions of the Social Security Act, in contrast, withholding would now 
be required, and for virtually all employees. There were a few exceptions, 
such as agricultural and domestic workers,164 but there was no income 
threshold beneath which withholding would not be required. So, for 
employers, the administrative burden was far greater than that imposed by 
the 1913 withholding, the system that led to an outcry and eventually to 
repeal in 1917.165 
Moreover, there was going to have to be a massive coordination effort 
between the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Social Security Board’s 
 
157 By June 30, 1937, six months after the system went into operation, the Social Security system’s 
central index contained more than 30 million names. See id. at 71. In contrast, only 3.4 million 
individuals paid personal income tax in 1937. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 113, at 593 tbl.41. 
158 ALTMEYER, supra note 156, at 87. 
159 Id. at 86–87. 
160 Id. at 71; CHARLES MCKINLEY & ROBERT W. FRASE, LAUNCHING SOCIAL SECURITY: A 
CAPTURE-AND-RECORD ACCOUNT, 1935–1937, at 309 (1970). 
161 See supra text accompanying note 141. 
162 1917 War Revenue Act, § 3, 40 Stat. 300, 301. 
163 See Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the 
Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 695 (1988–1989) (noting that in 1933, only 
2.6% of the population was subject to income tax). 
164 See Social Security Act, §§ 210(b), 811(b), 49 Stat. 620, 625, 639 (1935). 
165 See supra Part II.B. 
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Bureau of Old-Age Insurance. The details of this effort are, again, not 
crucial, but suffice it to say that 1936 and 1937 involved coordination 
challenges unlike any the Bureau of Internal Revenue had dealt with since 
Congress created the first Commissioner of Internal Revenue in 1862. 
The system set up by the tax authorities worked as follows: starting on 
January 1, 1937, every employer was required to file quarterly tax and 
information “returns” with the tax collector for the district of its principal 
place of business.166 The returns would provide the employer’s 
“identification number” and a list of all employees along with their 
“account numbers” (i.e., today’s Social Security number), both of which 
had just been created in a flurry of activity in the last two months of 
1936.167 The forms required calculating and then itemizing the tax for each 
employee (both the employer’s “excise” tax and the employee’s “income” 
tax), after which the return had to be “executed.” This meant verifying and 
signing the form—for corporations, by “the president, vice president, or 
other principal officer”—under oath before “any officer duly authorized to 
administer oaths.”168 When submitting the returns, the employer would of 
course also have to pay both taxes. 
As I noted, this was new and quite obviously a major hassle and 
expense for employers. So, as we think about how this system eventually 
became deeply entrenched, it is worth noting a few key points. 
First, employer opinion was solicited early on and was taken into 
account. This is despite the fact that many businesses were categorically 
opposed to the Social Security Act itself and were spearheading 
constitutional challenges to its various parts.169 One example showing how 
government officials incorporated employer concerns should suffice. The 
statute gave the Commissioner of Internal Revenue discretion to collect the 
taxes “either by making and filing returns, or by stamps, coupons, tickets, 
books, or other reasonable devices or methods necessary or helpful in 
securing . . . proper identification of the taxpayer.”170 There were two 
principal methods considered: a “stamp” approach and a system of filing 
returns. When the Committee on Economic Security had been drafting 
Roosevelt’s ideas for social security in 1934–1935, the academics advising 
the Committee looked to other advanced industrial societies with social 
security programs, Britain in particular, and explicitly recommended a 
“stamp tax system.”171 
 
166 Treas. Reg. §§ 401.402, 401.409 (1938). The tax returns were monthly during 1937, the first 
year of operation. Id. § 401.401. 
167 MCKINLEY & FRASE, supra note 160, at 364–74. 
168 Treas. Reg. § 401.407. 
169 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 5, at 184. 
170 Social Security Act, § 807(b), 49 Stat. 620, 637 (1935). 
171 MCKINLEY & FRASE, supra note 160, at 313–15; see also Lent, supra note 36, at 721 
(describing Australia’s use of a similar system for its normal income tax). 
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A stamp plan would work something like this: the employer would 
purchase stamps in an amount equal to the amount of tax it was going to 
withhold. These could either be physical adhesive stamps or use some form 
of metering like metered mail. Employers could purchase the stamps either 
at post offices or more likely directly from Social Security or Internal 
Revenue offices. The employer would then provide the stamps to the 
employee who would keep them in a passbook. The passbook would thus 
keep track of the employee’s “contributions.” When the book became full 
of stamps, the employee would turn it into the Internal Revenue office in 
exchange for some kind of a receipt. Many within the Social Security 
Board—influential Board member Arthur Altmeyer in particular—strongly 
favored the stamp-book approach.172 The thought was that this would be the 
simplest system for small employers and for those whose employees 
changed frequently (e.g., longshoremen and migrant workers).173 Most 
importantly, in keeping with Roosevelt’s view that employees should feel 
they have a “legal, moral, and, political right to collect their pensions,”174 
Altmeyer wanted employees to have proof that their employer had actually 
made contributions on their behalf.175 
The big problem with the stamp-book method, however, was that it 
required the employer to stamp the employee’s book each and every pay 
period. For small employers, this was not a huge deal and perhaps even 
preferable to filing regular—say, quarterly—returns with the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue. For large employers, in contrast, it would mean that they 
“would have to handle thousands of stamp books every pay period, which 
would be a very large burden upon them, particularly in view of the fact 
that the Bureau of Internal Revenue is very reluctant to require employers 
to buy or to rent any particular type of mechanical equipment.”176 Although 
Pitney–Bowes, which made the “mechanical equipment” that could 
perform this task, was strongly in favor of the stamp-tax approach,177 those 
in the Treasury anticipated the complaints such a system would lead to. So, 
the Treasury chose a system of filed returns.178 
Moreover, the government adopted the return system not just because 
it found the stamp-tax system unacceptable. It also sought to build on the 
pre-existing relationship between employers and the tax authorities. Recall 
that since 1917 employers had been required to provide “information-at-
 
172 MCKINLEY & FRASE, supra note 160, at 314. 
173 Id. 
174 SCHLESINGER, supra note 146, at 308. 
175 MCKINLEY & FRASE, supra note 160, at 314. 
176
 Id. at 316 (quoting Frank Mires, U.S. Treasury Department coordinator with the Social Security 
Board). 
177 Id. at 314. 
178 See Treas. Reg. § 401, subpart D (1938); Employees’ Tax and the Employers’ Tax Under Title 
VIII of the Social Security Act, 1 Fed. Reg. 1764, 1771–73 (Nov. 11, 1936). 
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source.” The system of returns and payment for the new “old-age 
insurance” taxes would be similar in nature and, as one Treasury official 
put it, “it would be a simple matter to coordinate these two activities so that 
little more would be required of the employer than he already does.”179 
Whether “little more would be required of the employer” was an accurate 
assessment of the burden or not—after all, the number of employees 
covered by Social Security far exceeded those subject to the income tax—
at least the idea was to build on what employers were already doing with 
respect to their employees’ taxes. So, incredibly enough, the 1917 
abandonment of stoppage at source in favor of information at source 
actually laid the groundwork for the choice of administrative method when 
withholding was next introduced into the law. One certainly cannot say the 
stamp-tax approach would have otherwise been adopted or that it 
necessarily would have been less successful had it been adopted, but there 
is a nice sense in which the edifice of withholding in 1936–1937 was built 
on the ashes of its destruction in 1917. 
In addition to the ways in which government officials specifically took 
employer concerns into account, the resulting entrenchment of withholding 
was also deeply intertwined with the political context of social security. 
The battles surrounding social security made withholding a relatively minor 
issue. While this was to some extent true of the 1913 income tax as well, 
the complaints about the administrative burdens of withholding in the teens 
transcended opposition to the income tax itself, while simultaneously 
feeding that opposition. Through 1916 and 1917, complaints about 
withholding continued after the Supreme Court upheld both the income tax 
and withholding itself.180 In contrast, once the Supreme Court upheld both 
the unemployment insurance181 and the old-age insurance provisions182 on 
the same day in May 1937, withholding was no longer an issue. Indeed, 
since the requirement to withhold the employees’ share of the new Title 
VIII tax was paired with the tax on employers, there was little additional 
administrative hassle associated with withholding the employees’ share. 
So, once the Court upheld the entire scheme of both Title II (old-age 
benefits) and Title VIII (income and excise taxes), it was no longer 
worthwhile for employers to complain about withholding per se. After all, 
getting rid of withholding alone would not reduce the burden of having to 
comply with—and pay—the employers’ excise tax. In contrast, the 1917 
repeal of withholding shifted the burden of paying the employees’ income 
tax entirely onto the employees themselves. 
 
179 MCKINLEY & FRASE, supra note 160, at 317 (quoting Frank Mires, U.S. Treasury Department 
coordinator with the Social Security Board). 
180 See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (upholding income tax against several 
constitutional challenges); id. at 21–22, 24 (upholding collection at source). 
181 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 578–98 (1937). 
182 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–45 (1937). 
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In sum, the Social Security Act’s tax on employees’ wage income 
brought withholding back to American law and did so in the context of a 
huge number of employers and employees. The law effectively forced 
employers to create managerial processes to deal with this new tax. With its 
$2500 exemption,183 the normal income tax remained the province of a 
small minority of relatively wealthy wage earners. Those taxpayers still 
paid their taxes once annually, and employers’ only responsibility was to 
provide the tax authorities with information, not cash. But the new system 
occasioned by the Social Security Act made it crystal clear that a 
withholding system was workable—for everyone: employees, employers, 
and the government alike. Withholding was now a part of the fabric of the 
American internal revenue collection process. 
Before the Second World War, withholding of income tax at source—
at least in the context of wage income—came in fits and starts, but with the 
Social Security Act, one can see the beginnings of what Eskridge and 
Ferejohn refer to as “administrative constitutionalism.”184 The law directed 
that employee contributions to social security be withheld, and the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue promulgated regulations that put teeth into the statute’s 
withholding requirement. When the statute was then upheld by the 
Supreme Court in May 1937, administrative structures were in place to 
entrench withholding. 
At this point, though, the beginnings of this entrenchment were 
premised almost entirely on a simple economic concept: the expenditure of 
start-up costs. By 1941, the system of withholding employee contributions 
to social security obviously could have been abolished—at least in literal 
terms—either by repealing the Social Security Act altogether or by shifting 
the burden of payment to the employee. The former was theoretically 
possible (though, of course, not with Roosevelt still as President!), but that 
sort of “repealing” would of course have been unconnected to withholding 
per se. The latter, on the other hand, was equally implausible, but for a 
different reason. Both the government and employers had invested the bulk 
of the resources, in terms of both money and managerial know-how, in 
setting the system up. The marginal cost of continuing with such a system 
was relatively low, and the disruption costs of change were unknown and, 
in any event, likely to be larger. This is entrenchment of a sort, akin to the 
co-ordination principle that Vermeule alludes to (e.g., we all drive on the 
right side of the road),185 but this hardly seems the stuff of constitutionalism 
or superstatutes. As we turn to the next chapter in the withholding saga, 
 
183 BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 113, at 512. 
184 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 5, at 29; cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 497 (2010) (using the 
phrase “administrative constitutionalism” in the context of arguing that ordinary administrative law can 
at times be viewed as constitutional common law). 
185 See Vermeule, supra note 10; supra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
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however, we will see a deeper entrenchment. Notice, moreover, that I still 
have not mentioned my putative superstatute. In this sense, the beginnings 
of entrenchment are, in contrast to Eskridge and Ferejohn’s model, 
occurring before the statute even gets passed. 
D. World War II 
World War II changed everything, and income tax policy was no 
exception. From a “class tax” to a “mass tax,” the income tax “changed its 
morning coat for overalls.”186 In 1940, there were seven million federal 
income taxpayers in the country; by 1945, that number had ballooned to 42 
million.187 As Professor Carolyn Jones has described it, “A tax intended at 
least symbolically to soak-the-rich during the Depression became a feature 
of everyday life for most Americans. It was an incredible 
transformation.”188 One key to this transformation was the government’s 
increased need for wartime revenue. A second factor was conscious 
government policy aimed at suppressing inflation,189 which war often 
causes.190 Like the Civil War, World War II brought the country 
phenomenal changes in tax policy. The difference, though, was that this 
time the changes survived the enemy’s surrender. 
Income tax withholding was a fundamental part of this transformation 
in tax policy. It permitted both the increase in tax rates and the reduction of 
exemption levels that led to the enormous increase in the number of 
Americans being subject to the income tax. This in turn facilitated the 
massive growth in government occasioned by the war and eased the 
process by which the “mass tax” aspect of the income tax survived the end 
of the war.191 
Tax policymakers recognized the importance of tax withholding as a 
tool in converting the income tax into a mass tax. Prior to World War II, 
income taxpayers paid federal tax in one chunk on March 15th of the year 
after the earning of the income.192 Taxpayers also had the option of paying 
 
186 Jones, supra note 163, at 685–86; id. at 695 (quoting PAUL, supra note 26, at 318). 
187 Id. at 686. 
188 Id. at 699. 
189 PAUL, supra note 26, at 281, 294; Lent, supra note 36, at 735. Not surprisingly, the need for 
wartime revenues, rather than inflation fighting, turned out to be the more successful approach to 
convincing the public that the mass income tax was a positive development. See Carolyn C. Jones, 
Mass-Based Income Taxation: Creating a Taxpaying Culture, 1940–1952, in FUNDING THE MODERN 
AMERICAN STATE, 1941–1995: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ERA OF EASY FINANCE 107, 114–15 (W. 
Elliot Brownlee ed., 1996). 
190 See BANK, supra note 39, at 168–70; ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL 
EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 204–11 (1987). 
191 See TWIGHT, supra note 30, at 96 (“Withholding is the paramount administrative mechanism 
that since 1943 has enabled the federal government to collect, without significant protest, sufficient 
private resources to fund a vastly expanded welfare state.”). 
192 See I.R.C. § 56(a) (1940). 
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in four quarterly installments, starting on that same day.193 In either case, 
the approach required a level of liquidity that many people would find 
difficult. So, for example, in 1940, an unmarried individual with a weekly 
income of, say, $200 and no investment income would have had an annual 
tax bill of $316.194 It is not difficult to see how this would require some 
cash flow planning for that March 15th bill. When the income tax was only 
affecting the top 2.6% of the population,195 the government expected 
individuals to have the wherewithal to plan around this problem. Once the 
income tax was to affect nearly 70% of the population,196 however, this 
simply was not possible. 
In 1942, Beardsley Ruml made a variation of this cash flow problem 
famous. Ruml, the Chairman of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, was 
simultaneously working for R.H. Macy’s & Co. at the time, and his 
example was meant to make the time-lag problem of income tax payments 
more vivid.197 He described a successful executive who retires and is given 
a pension. In Ruml’s telling, the executive can never afford his income tax 
bill because in the first year of retirement, he needs not only the pension 
but also a top-up of enough additional money to pay the taxes from his 
previous year’s (higher) salary. Then, in the second year after retiring, he 
still needs more than his pension because he has to pay taxes on the 
previous year’s pension plus taxes on the previous year’s top-up to pay the 
income tax from the year before that. The process continues indefinitely. 
Ruml’s solution was current tax payment. Tax would be due as the 
income was earned, so that no one could have a mismatch between income 
and tax liability. Importantly—and, a point to which I will return—the 
actual “Ruml plan” would have resulted in a complete forgiveness of one 
year’s taxes in the transition to “current tax payment.” Taxpayers would 
just start paying “on this year instead of on last year.”198 Moreover, Ruml’s 
proposal included little about withholding. The presumption was that 
taxpayers would still pay just as they always had, directly to the Treasury. 
The problem Ruml worried about was a cash flow or planning problem, not 
a tax collection problem; it was a problem from the perspective of the 
taxpayer, not the tax collector.199 
 
193 See id. § 56(b). 
194 His annual income would be 52 × $200 = $10,400. He would be entitled to a $2500 exemption. 
This would yield taxable income of $7900, and the tax rate was a flat 4%. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, 
supra note 113, at 512. 
195 This was the percentage of the population subject to the income tax in 1933. See Jones, supra 
note 163, at 695. 
196 In 1943, the figure was 68.9%. Id. 
197 PAUL, supra note 26, at 328–29. 
198 Id. at 329 (quoting Ruml). 
199 See Beardsley Ruml, Ruml’s Own Story, 21 TAXES 160 (1943). 
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At the same time, Treasury officials—in particular, Randolph Paul, 
Treasury’s General Counsel and a key player on tax policy issues—realized 
that the transformation of the income tax into a mass tax had dramatic 
implications for collections. Among their worries was the problem of tax 
compliance. Their solution was to bring withholding back to the income 
tax.200 So, in November 1941, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau 
presented to Congress a proposal for collection at source.201 The idea built 
on one initially proposed by Albert G. Hart, an economics professor at 
Iowa State.202 At first, nothing came of it. Incredibly enough, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Guy Helvering, opposed the plan on 
the grounds that he viewed it as administratively unworkable.203 Despite 
Helvering’s opposition, though, Morgenthau pushed the idea to Congress in 
1942, and the House passed a revenue bill that included a comprehensive 
set of withholding provisions, applying to dividends and bond interest 
income, as well as wages.204 The Senate rejected the House’s withholding 
provisions, but simultaneously passed a bill that included a supplemental 
tax known as the Victory Tax. The Victory Tax was a flat 5% tax imposed 
only on salaries and wages for all income above a $624 annual exemption; 
the tax was expected to last through the end of the war.205 With this 
extraordinarily low exemption, the Victory Tax hit nearly every wage 
earner, and to accomplish this dramatic increase in the tax rolls, the Victory 
Tax was to be collected through withholding at source.206 The House agreed 
to the Senate’s version, and with that, the Revenue Act of 1942 re-
introduced withholding to the “income tax,” albeit for only one portion of 
the income tax, the Victory Tax. 
“With a foot in the door,” the Treasury sought to expand withholding 
to the rest of the income tax.207 This, however, would have to wait until the 
following year, and would make its way into law only after colliding with 
the Ruml plan. 
Key, though, was that step by step, withholding was becoming an 
administrative feature of tax collection. By 1943, income tax withholding 
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was integrated into two different types of income taxes—Social Security 
taxes and the Victory Tax—both of which applied to the vast majority of 
employees. The administrative machinery for withholding as a collection 
method had now been established. Randolph Paul, Henry Morgenthau, and 
others all understood that the operation of a system of withholding was 
now workable in a way that it had not been back in 1913.208 Employers 
were now used to it, and though there might be opposition, administrative 
costs and inconvenience would no longer have the salience they had had 
thirty years earlier. 
The central opposition to withholding—besides the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue’s—centered around the transition to current payment: if the 
system were to switch from payment in the year following the tax liability 
to current payment, there would be a year (the transition year) during which 
individuals would have to pay two years’ worth of taxes, the past year’s 
and the current year’s. Many, including Ruml, described such a state of 
affairs as akin to “double” taxation. They sought a complete forgiveness of 
a full year’s taxes.209 Under this way of thinking, shifting to current 
payment while forgiving the previous year’s tax liability in full would 
continue to provide a consistent uninterrupted flow of tax revenues to the 
Treasury: “[A]s far as the Treasury and income were concerned, things 
would move along just the same as time moves on under daylight 
saving . . . .”210 Indeed, as an economic matter, there is a good argument 
that switching to current payment would increase the Treasury’s revenues, 
even holding rates and exemptions constant and even with complete 
forgiveness of the previous year’s taxes. If national income increases from 
one year to the next, the Treasury’s revenues would similarly increase.211 
As economist Charlotte Twight points out, a second potential issue 
with a switch to current payment involves the time value of money.212 
Requiring taxpayers to pay taxes a year earlier—even if the nominal dollar-
value liability is the same—actually constitutes a tax increase. A hundred 
dollars today is worth more than a hundred dollars a year from now, 
particularly in an era such as World War II when inflation and nominal 
interest rates were so high. Knowing the economic sophistication of those 
advocating the switch to current payment, Twight accuses Treasury 
officials at the time of “important misrepresentations” because they insisted 
that withholding did not increase anyone’s taxes.213 This may well have 
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been the case with respect to the Treasury’s plan for withholding, which 
involved “current payment” and no forgiveness. Indeed, public support for 
withholding may well have been dependent on the idea of forgiveness.214 
But, recall that withholding can theoretically occur after the liability is 
incurred, much like, say, the way garnishment of wages for child support 
works today.215 Moreover, if an entire year’s liability was to be forgiven—
as in the initial Ruml plan—the only time-value-of-money problem in the 
switch to current payment would be for those whose incomes increase, and 
the problem would only apply to the tax-liability difference between the 
current and the previous year. 
Of course, the Ruml plan, with Ruml’s allusion to a “daylight savings” 
switch, had its own problems, chief among them the perception (and most 
likely, reality) that forgiveness would lead to a huge boon to the richest 
Americans in the midst of what was supposed to be a moment of wartime 
sacrifice. As 1942 wore on and 1943 began, the public conception of 
withholding became intertwined not only with current payment, but also 
forgiveness. In the public’s mind, the Ruml plan became the face of 
withholding, and many taxpayers began to think that they would not be 
required to pay their 1942 taxes (or at least the first quarterly payment) on 
March 15, 1943, as the law provided. Congressional leaders reminded the 
country that the law on the books still required that March 15th payment.216 
At the same time, Treasury officials, Democrats in Congress, and the 
President were all categorically opposed to forgiveness. As Roosevelt put 
it, “I cannot acquiesce in the elimination of a whole year’s tax burden on 
the upper-income groups during a war period when I must call for an 
increase in taxes and savings from the mass of our people.”217 
In sum, 1943 saw government officials strongly advocating a new 
system of current-payment withholding while facing numerous obstacles. 
Notice, however, that except for Helvering’s opposition based on 
administrative complexity, none of these were problems with withholding 
per se, but were rather features of “current payment” and in particular, 
problems only with the transition. This is important, as it meant that 
opposition was not focused on what turned out to be the most important 
and lasting change the law was to make: the switch to employer 
withholding of employees’ income tax. 
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Given these complexities and objections, the resulting law was not 
surprisingly a compromise. Roosevelt signed the Current Tax Payment Act 
of 1943 on June 9th. The law provided for withholding of all income taxes 
and provided that taxes were to be paid based on current income.218 The law 
cancelled 75% of one year of an individual’s taxes, based on the lower of 
the taxpayer’s 1942 or 1943 tax liability.219 To ease the cash flow problem, 
the unforgiven amount was due in two installments, on March 15, 1944, 
and March 15, 1945.220 Importantly, amidst the many compromises that had 
to be made to get the bill passed, withholding remained a centerpiece of the 
legislation and garnered little opposition in Congress.221 Although many 
Democrats in Congress fumed about the windfall given to the wealthy, the 
trade-off was probably a small price to pay for what may well have been 
one of the most transformative changes in the history of the federal tax 
system. As Professor Jones has put it, the Act “revolutionized the income 
tax” in large part by helping to “creat[e] a taxpaying culture.”222 By doing 
this, the Current Tax Payment Act’s reintroduction of withholding into the 
American income tax system helped to “ensure[] the status of the income 
tax as a major and massive revenue source.”223 
At this point, let me make a disclaimer. I do not intend to argue about 
whether withholding is a good or bad thing as a normative matter. Others, 
such as Professor Twight, have indicted withholding as a tool of 
oppression.224 To decide whether tax withholding is good or bad, though, 
one must take a position, whether explicitly or implicitly, on the question 
of whether the federal government takes in the right amount of revenue, 
and in the right way. This in turn implicitly assumes a position on the 
appropriateness of the size of federal spending—indeed, of the federal 
government itself. Advocates of lower taxes such as Twight have clear 
views that the federal government is too large, making it easy to reject 
withholding.225 Similarly, when Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau and 
General Counsel Randolph Paul pushed for withholding, they too had clear 
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views on the size of the federal government, though of course they believed 
the collective good justified the increase in revenues facilitated by 
withholding. Whatever one’s views of the appropriate size of the federal 
government, however, there is little question that withholding facilitates—
indeed, enables—government growth in ways that both proponents and 
opponents of a large federal government recognize. Whether Twight is 
correct that federal taxation involved “bloated expropriations of [the 
public’s] earnings,”226 there is little question that she is correct that 
returning to the pre-1943 system of having individuals pay their tax 
liabilities in one chunk would “focus the taxpayer’s mind on the cost of 
government,”227 most likely increasing opposition to federal income taxes. 
Moreover, there is little question that the mechanism by which this occurs 
involves both the “installment” nature of the payments (smaller payments 
made more often) as well as the less transparent nature of taxation that 
withholding permits. 
It is also most probably the case, as Professor Jones has argued, that 
the fact that withholding arose in the context of both war and a concerted 
government propaganda campaign about paying taxes in general helped 
maintain withholding.228 Now one might also question whether it is 
appropriate to use the pejorative term “propaganda” to describe the public 
relations campaign to induce people to pay taxes. One might instead simply 
call it an effort to prevent law breaking on the part of a massive number of 
new taxpayers. In any event, the simple descriptive point is clear, and it 
applies both as a historical fact about the introduction of withholding into 
the modern federal income tax system and as a contemporary statement 
about the likely psychological impact of withholding on current taxpayers: 
withholding has enabled, and continues to enable, a much larger federal 
government than we would have without it. How much larger is anyone’s 
guess, but it would be hard to dispute “larger.” 
This larger federal government is one sense in which the Current Tax 
Payment Act of 1943 can be thought of as a superstatute. A second, related 
sense is the way it fundamentally structures the relationship between the 
individual and the federal government. By placing the employer in a 
position of providing money directly to the federal government on behalf of 
the taxpayer, withholding helps mediate that relationship. This, of course, 
is why April 15th takes on such importance in taxpayers’ minds. 
Withholding makes income tax filing the focus of the taxpayer’s 
relationship with the government by shielding the taxpayer from the 
relationship during the rest of the year. 
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CONCLUSION 
Is the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 a superstatute? If we ignore 
the courts altogether, we have some reasons to think so. First, it structures 
the relationship between individuals and the state in a fundamental way; it 
constitutes, so to speak, that relationship. Second, it is entrenched in a de 
facto sense. That entrenchment plays itself out in the way policy advocates 
on all sides of the political spectrum have largely treated withholding of 
taxes on wage liability as an assumed part of the tax policy landscape. 
Third, the fact that the law is entrenched is both a historical consequence of 
what Eskridge and Ferejohn refer to as “administrative constitutionalism” 
and a spur to an even more complex administrative structure that 
effectively provided a positive feedback loop to entrench the law further. In 
that sense, it fits perfectly into the concept of a superstatute. 
It is probably not entrenched, however, in at least one of the ways 
Eskridge and Ferejohn implicitly view superstatutes. The statute has not 
really embedded a value or norm into the public consciousness. 
Withholding is not, in Eskridge and Ferejohn’s words, a norm or practice 
that is accepted “because of the force of a Weberian constellation of 
interests, namely, a popular consensus that the norm or practice is a good 
thing to believe or do.”229 It is simply part of the underlying fabric of tax 
collection and enforcement. While tax wonks might view it as a “good 
thing to . . . do” (or not), the public is simply not conscious of it (despite 
being quite conscious of taxes as a general matter). The law might thus be 
viewed as akin to a coordination benefit like driving on the right side of the 
road. 
Thought of through this lens, perhaps even opponents of the policy 
effects that withholding of wage income entails (e.g., better enforcement of 
tax liability for wage income; possibly comparatively better tax evasion 
potential for income from nonwage sources) are willing to accept 
withholding because eliminating it would cause enough other negative 
effects. Yet, that doesn’t seem quite right either. As I noted in Part I, 
eliminating withholding would be an extremely good policy for anyone 
who advocates a reduction in actual federal tax revenues. 
Finally, there is one other very important way in which the Current 
Tax Payment Act of 1943 cannot even remotely be viewed as a 
superstatute. It has had virtually no effect on judicial interpretations of the 
large “C” Constitution. We might say that authority for the federal 
government to collect income taxes via withholding is now embedded into 
the Sixteenth Amendment. Beyond that somewhat minor constitutional 
holding, however, it is difficult to imagine what else the extensive history 
of withholding has done to the large “C” Constitution or judicial 
interpretations of it. 
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In the end, then, what the history of federal tax withholding tells us is 
that there may well be entrenched statutes littered throughout the law, 
statutes that evoke no value of any kind and yet are fundamental to the 
operation of the government. Whether one views such statutes as “super” 
enough may well be just a function of how important public values or 
norms are to the definition of a superstatute. 
